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TORT REFORM AND IMPLIED CONFLICT
PREEMPTION
MARTIN A. KOTLER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

For many years, the argument that federal legislation or,
more commonly, rules promulgated by federal agencies, serve to
preclude adjudication under state tort law undoubtedly seemed
far-fetched. While courts occasionally found federal preemption,
there seemed to be a general consensus that while Congress had
the authority under the Supremacy Clause' to enact laws that
superseded state legislation, state administrative regulation, or
local ordinances, absent a "clear and manifest" statement of intent
to preempt, the development of common-law doctrine was an area
reserved to the states. 2
Beginning with the Court's decision in Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.,3 the displacement of tort law under the doctrine of
federal preemption has, in David Owen's words, "grown from little
more than a blip on the radar screen to one of the most powerful
defenses in all of products liability law."4 The key to
understanding the importance of Cipollone lies in the
interpretation of a single clause in the legislation at issue. The
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 (as
amended in 1969) provided that "[njo requirement or prohibition . .
. shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising
or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provision of this Act."5 If, as the lower court
had concluded, the phrase only precluded action by state
legislatures and regulatory bodies, state courts applying state
* Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law

1. Article VI provides, in part, "[t]he Constitution, and the laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; .

.

. shall be the

supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby ..... U.S. CONST. art. VI.
2. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (stating
"we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.").
3. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
4. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTs LIABILITY LAW, § 14.4 (2005).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1969) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1965)).
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products liability law could find cigarettes to be defective
notwithstanding the fact that cigarette packages were labeled in
conformity with federal law. If, on the other hand, the imposition
of tort liability constituted a "requirement or prohibition" under
state law that was forbidden by the federal statute, tort liability
was precluded as well.
It is this idea that common-law tort damages serve as a form
of state regulation that may conflict with federal law or policy that
lies at the heart of the federal preemption debate. In Cipollone,
Justice Stevens, responding to the petitioner's argument that the
express preemption provision at issue applied only to state
legislation and regulation, not to common-law tort actions,
asserted: "[State] regulation can be as effectively exerted through
an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief.
The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to
be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy."6
The decision to include tort law together with state legislation
and regulation was, in fact, a departure from the prevailing view. 7
Nevertheless, eight years later in Geier v. American Honda Motor
Co., Inc.,8 the Court dramatically expanded the preemption
doctrine in holding that courts could find that federal legislation or
administrative regulation implicitly preempted state tort law
where the imposition of liability was found to conflict with federal
law or policy either in the sense that became impossible to comply
with both state and federal law or in the sense that the imposition
of liability under state law would serve to frustrate federal policy
objectives. 9 Unfortunately, neither in Geier nor in the decisions
6. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)).
7. See id. at 537 n.3 (pointing out that "[t]he Court has explained that
Garmon, in which a state common-law damages award was found to be preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, involved a special 'presumption
of federal pre-emption' relating to the primary jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board.") (Blackman, J., concurring and dissenting); see also
infra text accompanying notes 339-47 (arguing that Garmon represented a
distinctive form conflict preemption based on the allocation of decision-making
authority, rather than substantive policy objectives).
The distinction between preemption of state statutory and regulatory
actions, as distinct from common-law litigation, according to the dissent, had a
long, established history. See id. at 538-39 ("In light of the recognized
distinction in this Court's jurisprudence between direct state regulation and
the indirect regulatory effects of common-law damages actions, it cannot be
said that damages claims are clearly or unambiguously 'requirements' or
'prohibitions' imposed under state law. The plain language of the 1969 Act's
modified pre-emption provision simply cannot bear the broad interpretation
the plurality would impart to it.") (Blackman, J., concurring and dissenting).
See also infra note 165.
8. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
9. Id. at 873 (explaining "[t]he Court has not previously driven a legal
wedge-only a terminological one--between 'conflicts' that prevent or
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that followed has the Court provided any basis for identifying the
federal policy at issue, let alone determining when state tort law
should be found to frustrate its implementation.10
Given the lack of guidance from above, lower federal court
and state court judges have filled the vacuum by imposing their
own values and political ideologies, often abolishing large areas of
state tort law generally, and products liability law specifically, in a
wave of what can only be described as tort reform from the bench.
Numerous scholars and commentators have analyzed and
reanalyzed the Supreme Court decisions seeking to explain and
harmonize the cases," or to suggest new directions. 12 The goal of
this Article is somewhat different; it is to show how some state
courts and lower federal courts have responded in the face of
doctrinal uncertainty and confusion and to put those responses
into the broader historical context of the evolution of products
liability law as it has moved from strict liability, to negligence, to
no liability. To be sure, the final step of across-the-board immunity
from tort liability has not yet been completed and the demise of
products liability law, in specific, or tort law, in general, certainly
is not inevitable. Nevertheless, a few serious scholars have
expressed their concerns and warned of the dangers.1 3 Those
frustrate the accomplishment of a federal objective and 'conflicts' that make it
'impossible' for private parties to comply with both state and federal law.
Rather, it has said that both forms of conflicting state law are 'nullified' by the
Supremacy Clause .... .").
10. See, e.g., Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1139
(2011) (holding that the regulation did not preempt a products liability action
alleging defectiveness based on the fact that the vehicle lacked a rear shoulder
belt).
11. See, e.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The Normalization of Product
Preemption Doctrine, 57 ALA. L. REV. 725, 726 (2006) (noting that "[s]cholars
have long observed that the United States Supreme Court's preemption
doctrine has been fraught with uncertainty, leading to unpredictable results in
the lower courts.").
12. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, The Products Liability Restatement: Was It a
Success?: Implied Reverse Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 669 (2009) (arguing
that interpreting congressional intent should be taken to the next level to
determine when congressional action (or inaction) permits an inference of the
abandonment of an earlier preemptive intention).
The exercise of drawing inferences about what a legislature one
intended with respect to regulation necessarily entail the possibility of
inferring that the legislature has relinquished an older inferred intent
on this point. Any doctrine of implied preemption that does not
recognize the possibility of abandoning a once-held preemptive scheme
cuts courts off from reality. Dropping the regulatory ball is as normal
and predictable-just as integral to regulation-as picking it up.
Id. at 682. Moreover, Professor Bernstein specifically argues "that at some
point during a period of seventeen years, Congress ceased to intend, if it ever
did intend, to assert a federal safety-regulatory stance that precluded tort
liability for injuries attributed to consumer products." Id. at 675.
13. Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
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warnings need to be taken seriously.
The process by which tort has been undercut is not only a
product of tort reform from the bench.14 During the George W.
Bush administration, preempting tort law by administrative
agency action was openly pursued as part of a corporate
protectionism agenda.' 5 However, more important for purposes of
this Article is the recognition that many judges who share that
viewpoint are actively engaged in accomplishing the same result.
To pretend that judges are above partisan politics and not
influenced by ideological considerations and predispositions is
simply unrealistic and unhelpful.16
Although the courts have repeatedly asserted that federal
preemption is grounded in congressional intent,17 these attempts
to place the responsibility at Congress's doorstep are
unconvincing.18 Arguments about institutional intent in the face of
a changing legal landscape of underlying preemption
jurisprudence and in the face of a changing legal landscape in
products liability law seem unlikely to be more than marginally

Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992); Robert L. Rabin,
Poking Holes in the Fabric of Tort, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 293 (2007); Catherine
M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble:FederalAgencies and the Federalization
of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007).
14. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC
OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING
OF THE CONSTITUTION (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2009) (explaining the effect

of public opinion on the Court).
15. See Sharkey, supra note 13 (discussing and documenting a concerted
effort to use federal preemption language inserted into the preamble of agency
reports (and thus not subject to the notice and comment requirement) as a
means of achieving tort reform during the George W. Bush Administration);
see also Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Preemption of State Common
Law by FederalAgency Action: Striking the AppropriateBalance that Protects
Public Safety, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1203, 1219-22 (2010) (critically discussing
actions taken by the Obama Administration to limit the use of preemption
regulatory preambles); see also Roger I. Abrams, Tort Law and "Family
Values," 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 619, 622 (1996) (observing that "[i]n order to
promote the interests of the class of traditional defendants-product
manufacturers and physicians, for example, who have been chilled by the
prospect of unlimited, uncertain and uninsurable damage costs-political and
judicial actors have revised tort law principles.").
16. In fact, the view that the judicial role encompasses a legislative function
(and perhaps ought to) has entered the mainstream. See generally, Edmund
Ursin, How Great Judges Think: Judges Richard Posner, Henry Friendly, and
Roger Traynor on Judicial Lawmaking, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1267 (2009) (noting
views on judicial decision making).
17. But see Mark Seidenfeld, Who Decides Who Decides: Federal Regulatory
Preemption of State Tort Law, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 611, 612 (2010)
(dealing with agency preemption "in the absence of statutory instruction").
18. Although congressional power to solve the problem is undeniable, it is
safe to assume that the power will not be exercised.
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productive in all but the most obvious situations.1 9 This is
particularly true once one accepts that, even if individual
congressmen and women may have actually had some relevant
intention, unless it is stated clearly, attempts to parse ambiguous
language or examine the structure of the law for hints of intention
is fundamentally an exercise in futility. 20 Thus, as we move beyond
those instances where the topic of preemption has been expressly
addressed by Congress, 21 or conclusions arise by obvious
implication and find ourselves in the morass of most implied
preemption cases, 22 charges of judicial activism take on a level of
plausibility that risks undercutting judicial legitimacy. 23
The proposal made here is necessarily modest. Courts need to
recognize that common-law litigation can conflict with federal
policy in three different ways, rather than the two acknowledged
by the courts. In addition to so-called "impossibility conflict," there
are at least two distinct forms of frustration of federal purpose
conflict-substantive and procedural.24 Finding state common-law
litigation displaced in the case of the latter, but not the former,

19. See, e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1082 (2011) (noting
"[w]hen 'all (or nearly all) of the' relevant judicial decisions have given a term
or concept a consistent judicial gloss, we presume Congress intended the term
or concept to have that meaning when it incorporated it into a later-enacted
statute. . . . We cannot make the same assumption when widespread

disagreement exists among the lower courts.").
20. See Bernstein, supra note 12, at 674 (noting that other scholars have
pointed out that "the indicators of a tacit decision by Congress to bar state tort
claims are both unclear and controversial."). See also Bruesewitz, supra note
19, at 1075, 1092 (presenting conflicting analyses of the language of the
statute at issue).
21. See Rabin, supra note 13, at 297 (noting that "Congress has been
notoriously vague in indicating its intention to preempt, let alone its intention
to delegate this power to an agency pursuant to the creation of regulatory
authority.").
22. Criticizing both the Supreme Court and Congress for ambiguity see
Robert L. Rabin, ReassessingRegulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2058
(2000) and Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1, 28 (1997).
23. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 894.
When a state statute, administrative rule, or common-law cause of
action conflicts with a federal statute, it is axiomatic that the state law
is without effect. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the
Supremacy Clause does not give unelected federal judges carte blanche
to use federal law as a means of imposing their own ideas of tort reform
on the States.
Id. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also, e.g., Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at
1100 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (asserting "[t]he majority's decision today
disturbs that careful balance based on a bare policy preference that it is better
'to leave complex epidemiological judgments about vaccine design to the FDA
and the National Vaccine Program rather than juries."') (internal citation
omitted), and infra notes 349-57 and accompanying text.
24. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
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will provide at least some guidance to the judiciary, permit cases
to be decided in a principled manner, acknowledge the evolving
role of products liability doctrine, and avoid the ongoing problem of
leaving wronged and injured plaintiffs without recourse.
The Article will proceed as follows: in Part II, after reviewing,
in somewhat summary fashion, the twists and turns of products
liability law since the adoption of 402A25 in 1965, we turn to the
question the current understanding of the function of imposing
liability for defectively designed products. Somewhat more
specifically, the section traces design-defect theory from
instrumentalist strict liability to negligence liability (with a focus
on the assignment of personal responsibility to others) to the
current trend toward the formulation of instrumentalist noliability rules. It is within the context of the current trend of "noliability" that the implied preemption doctrine has been brought to
bear to threaten tort law. In Part III, the Article takes up the
recurrent problem of the legislative power to abrogate commonlaw tort liability, federalism concerns, and implied preemption. In
that context, it seeks to analyze and explain impossibility conflict
preemption, frustration of federal purpose preemption, and to
distinguish the latter from field preemption. Part IV, looks to the
Consumer Product Safety Commission's regulation of disposable
lighterS26 and the cases finding and refusing to find federal
preemption, and seeks to illustrate not only the common confusion
between implied conflict preemption and the statutory or
regulatory compliance defense, but, more importantly, to make
clear the unworkability of implied conflict preemption as currently
understood. Additionally, the Article seeks to explicate the third
type of conflict preemption, a distinction the Cipollone plurality
and subsequent Court -decisions largely ignored. Nevertheless, if
conflict preemption is limited so as to exclude substantive
frustration conflicts, many concerns can be eliminated.

II.

THE COMMON-LAW LIABILITY STANDARD IN CASES OF
DESIGN DEFECT

A. A BriefReview of the Evolution of "Strict"Products
Liability Doctrine
Many books and articles have described the evolution of the

standard of liability for badly designed products from its initial
modern formulation in the dicta of Greenman v. Yuba Power

25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) ("proposing" strict
liability in tort on sellers of defective products).
26. Safety Standard for Cigarette Lighters, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,557-01 (July 12,
1993) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1210).
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ProductS27 in 1963 into the mid-1980s. While rehashing the
progression in any detail is unnecessary for the purposes of this
Article, a few comments may be helpful to put the current state of
affairs into perspective. 28
First, the underpinnings of the strict liability experiment
were explicated to an unusually large extent by academicians. 29
Most, or at least much, of the academic literature of the time can
be fairly described as "instrumentalist."30 Tort law generally, and
products liability law in particular, was increasingly viewed as a
public law system that was to be designed and implemented to
accomplish specified social goals other than (or in addition to) the
resolution of a specified dispute between litigants. Not
surprisingly, the goals to be accomplished varied depending on the
viewpoint and values of the academician. The law and economics
scholars-initially largely led by Richard Posner-argued that the
goal should be efficiency in order to maximize wealth (or utility).31
Some scholars argued for wealth maximization without regard for
distributional justice considerations, while others fine-tuned the
approach to take distribution into account. Thus, for example, the
concept of Pareto efficiency (or Pareto optimality) sought to add
the requirement that allocation or reallocation of resources be
done in a way that "will leave no individual worse off and at least
one individual better off."32

27. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). The views
expressed by Justice Traynor in Greenman largely echo similar views
expressed in his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150
P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
28. For a history of strict products liability leading up to Greenman, see
generally James R. Hackney, Jr., The Intellectual Origins of American Strict
ProductsLiability: A Case Study in American PragmaticInstrumentalism, 39
Am.

J. LEGAL

HIST. 443 (1995).

29. See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 215-43 (Oxford University Press 1980) (noting the
origins of tort law).
30. See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, The Death of Causation: Mass Products
Torts' Incomplete Incorporation of Social Welfare Principles,41 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 943, 948 n.13 (2006) (explaining that "[t]he instrumental theory of tort
law posits that the tort system pursues policy objectives derived from the
needs of society external to the legal system, such as wealth maximization,
accident prevention, or the distribution of losses.").
31. See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics and Legal Theory, 8
J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979) (distinguishing wealth maximization and
utilitarianism); RICHARD A. POSNER, The Ethical and Political Basis of the
Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, in LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PHILOSOPHY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION, WITH APPLICATIONS TO THE LAW OF
TORTS (Mark Kuperberg & Charles R. Beitz eds. 1983).
32. Joseph M. Steiner, Economics, Morality, and the Law of Torts, 26
TORONTO L.J. 227, 229 (1976). See also Robert Cooter, Torts as the Union of
Liberty and Efficiency: An Essay on Causation,63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 523, 524
(1987) (explaining Pareto efficiency).
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Efficiency, even tempered by concerns for distributional
consequences, was not the sole value promoted. For example, upon
Guido Calabresi's argument that the goal should be a macro
reduction of accident costs to be accomplished by imposing liability
on the party who is in the best position to engage in a cost-benefit
analysis, the famous "cheapest cost avoider,"83 John Attanasio
built his theory of "aggregate autonomy" in which he argued "that
the Calabresian liability model promotes the most important
autonomy interests of the greatest number of persons, while
promoting utility and efficiency in the process." 34
On the other hand, building on an intellectual tradition
dating back to the early days of the twentieth century, numerous
academicians and judges came to view tort law as a form of social
insurance. 35 Under this view, the compensatory function of tort
would serve to prevent the "social dislocation" experienced by
accident victims. 36 Rather than pay premiums to private insurers
33. See Guido Calabresi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 95-129, 174-97, 266-73 (Yale University Press 1970)
(developing the concept of "cheapest cost avoider" as a means to reduce
accident costs); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) ("[Manufacturers are in] the
best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and
accident avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made.").
34. David G. Owen, Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward
FirstPrinciples,68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 493 (1993) (discussing John B.
Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian
Approach to ProductsLiability, 74 VA. L. REV. 677 (1988)).
35. See generally Hackney, Jr., supra, note 28, at 491 (noting "in the
landmark treatise, The Law of Torts, which [Fleming] James authored with
Fowler Harper, an entire chapter was devoted to 'social insurance.' At the
beginning of the chapter, a direct reference is made connecting the torts
project James wished to pursue with 'workmen's compensation in 1910' and
'1930's social insurance legislation.' In the treatise, the importance of social
insurance is discussed, along with the litany of ills that concerned the social
insurance theorists . . . ."); see also James Henderson, Revising Section 402A:
The Limits of Tort as Social Insurance, 10 TOURO L. REV. 107, 120 (1993)
(characterizing tort as social insurance as "a miserable flop").
36. Hackney, Jr., supra,note 28, at 470. Discussing HENRY SEAGER, SOCIAL
INSURANCE: A PROGRAM FOR SOCIAL REFORM (Macmillan 1910), Hackney
explains:
Seager was particularly concerned with the ideology of individualism,
and he believed that the ability to adopt social insurance schemes
hinged upon changing the "state of the public mind" regarding
individualism. Seager argued that this transformation, and the
consequent social insurance program, would be vital in guarding
against the social dislocation befalling those who were unfortunately
beset by social ills. Social dislocation came in the form of economic
hardships to families suffering a loss of income and insufficient savings.
Workers had very little money to save and the "failure of wage earners
to provide . . . against emergencies was . . . proof that collective

remedies must be found and applied. . .
Id.
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andlor fund governmental social welfare programs though
individual contributions or general tax revenues, institutional
defendants or classes of defendants would, through the imposition
of strict liability, compensate accident victims and spread the costs
of accidents over a large class of products (or services) to
37
consumers through their pricing mechanism.
The "tort as social insurance" approach reached its pinnacle
(or nadir, depending on one's view) in the 1970s and 1980s with

decisions in Beshada v. Johns Manville Products Corp.,38 in the

New Jersey Supreme Court, Hall v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 3 9 in the federal district court in New York, and in Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories40 in the California Supreme Court.

1. The HindsightApproach to Strict Liability
Beshada was an asbestos case based, in part, on the
defendants' alleged failure to warn of the dangers of inhalation of
the asbestos fibers. The defendants responded that they could not,
at the time of marketing, warn of the dangers because the dangers
were scientifically "unknowable" at the time (the "state of the art"
defense). 41 Rejecting this argument, the court reasoned:
Essentially, state-of-the-art is a negligence defense. It seeks
to explain why defendants are not culpable for failing to
provide a warning. They assert, in effect, that because they
could not have known the product was dangerous, they acted
reasonably in marketing it without a warning. But in strict
liability cases, culpability is irrelevant. The product was
unsafe. That it was unsafe because of the state of technology
does not change the fact that it was unsafe. Strict liability
focuses on the product, not the fault of the manufacturer. "If
the conduct is unreasonably dangerous, then there should be
strict liability without reference to what excuse defendant
might give for being unaware of the danger."
When the defendants argue that it is unreasonable to impose
a duty on them to warn of the unknowable, they misconstrue
both the purpose and effect of strict liability. By imposing

37. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring) (asserting that "[i]t
is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard
against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury
from defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of
an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to
the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by
the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business.").
38. Beshada v. Johns Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
39. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
40. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
41. Id. at 545-56.
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strict liability, we are not requiring defendants to have done
something that is impossible. In this sense, the phrase "duty
to warn" is misleading. It implies negligence concepts with
their attendant focus on the reasonableness of defendant's
behavior. However, a major concern of strict liabilityignored by defendants-is the conclusion that if a product
was in fact defective, the distributor of the product should
compensate its victims for the misfortune that it inflicted on
them. 42
2. Industry-Wide Liability
Industry-wide liability, sometimes termed "enterprise
liability"43 was an approach developed for one case at the height of
judicial acceptance of cost shifting as the basis for strict liability in
tort. In Hall,44 thirteen children who had been injured by blasting
caps between 1955 and 1959 brought suit against the six American
manufacturers of blasting caps and their trade association. 45 It
was alleged "that the practice of the explosives industry during the
1950's . . . of not placing any warning upon individual blasting

caps and of failing to take other safety measure created an
unreasonable risk of harm resulting in plaintiffs' injuries."46
The initial hurdle, faced by each of the plaintiffs, was that
none could identify which of the named defendants had
manufactured the particular blasting cap that caused injury to
them. 47 Traditionally, of course, if a plaintiff could not identify the
tortfeasor who harmed him or her by a preponderance of the
evidence or make out a case that all of the defendants had been in
a relationship under which each would be vicariously liable for the
tortious misconduct of the others, the plaintiff would lose as a
matter of law. Seeking to find a basis upon which liability could be
imposed, however, the court developed a new theory called "joint
control of the risk." According to the court:
Joint control may be shown in one of three ways. First,
plaintiffs can prove the existence of an explicit agreement
and joint action among the defendants with regard to
warnings and other safety features-the classic "concert of

42. Id. at 546 (quoting W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of
Information, 48 TEX. L. REv. 398, 408 (1970)).
43. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 368 (noting the "approach has been variously
expressed as 'loss distribution,' 'risk allocation,' or 'enterprise liability."').
44. To be somewhat more precise, two cases were consolidated for decision.
As Judge Weinstein explained: "In Chance, the name of the manufacturer who
actually produced the cap causing a particular injury is apparently unknown.
In Hall it is, plaintiffs allege, known." Id. at 358. The facts recited above were
those of the Chance case.
45. Id. at 359.
46. Id. at 358.
47. Id.
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action." Second, plaintiffs can submit evidence of tacit
agreement or cooperation.
Third, plaintiff can submit evidence that defendants, acting
independently, adhered to an industry-wide standard or
custom with regard to the safety features of blasting caps.
Regardless of whether such evidence is sufficient to support
an inference of tacit agreement, it is still relevant to the
question of joint control of the risk. The dynamics of market
competition frequently results [sic] in explicit or implicit
safety standards, codes, and practices which are widely
adhered to in an entire industry. [T]he existence of industrywide standards or practices alone will not support, in all
circumstances, an imposition of joint liability. But where ...
individual defendant-manufacturers cannot be identified, the
existence of industry-wide standards or practices could
support a finding of joint control of risk and a shift of the
burden of proving causation to the defendants.48
The idea that an entire industry could be held liable for the
conduct of one member of that industry was justified not by the
fault or personal responsibility of any one member, but the (then)
accepted idea that tort law should seek to accomplish certain
instrumentalist objectives completely apart from the assignment
of personal responsibility. Thus, the court explained, "we are no
longer dealing with specific conduct but with the broad scope of a
whole enterprise. Further, we are not looking for that which can
and should reasonably be avoided, but with the more or less
inevitable toll of a lawful enterprise."49

3. Market-Share Liability
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratoriesowas a case that arose out of
the DES disaster. DES (diethylstilbestrol) was a synthetic
estrogen drug that was widely prescribed and sold to pregnant
women during the 1940s, '50s, and '60s to prevent miscarriage.5 1
As it turned out, not only was the drug allegedly ineffective for its
prescribed purpose, 52 but it also caused clear cell carcinoma and
pre-cancerous vaginal and cervical growths in the female children
of mothers that ingested it during pregnancy. 53
Because clear cell carcinoma is a so-called "signature disease,"
the causal link between DES ingestion and the disease was not an
issue. 54 The problem was that the disease had a long latency
48. Id. at 373-74 (citations omitted).
49. Id. at 377.
50. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 924.
51. Id. at 925.
52. Id. at 925-26.
53. Id. at 925.
54. See, e.g., Gerald W. Boston, A Mass Exposure Model of Toxic Causation:
The Content of Scientific Proofand the Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. OF
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period and did not show up until after the women affected passed
puberty. Moreover, the drug was sold as a generic and there were
literally hundreds of pharmaceutical companies manufacturing
it.55 When pharmacists were presented with a prescription for
DES, they simply filled the prescription with whichever brand
they had in stock.56 By the time the disease became manifest,
many of the manufacturers had gone out of business, as had the
pharmacies that sold it. Thus, it was often impossible to know just
whose product any individual plaintiffs mother had consumed.57
Again, as in Hall, of course, traditionally the plaintiff would have
the burden of proving the identity of the party that was alleged to
have caused her injury and, on the peculiar facts of these cases,
this was simply impossible.55
Arguably viewing tort as an insurance mechanism, the court
adopted an unconventional approach that had been proposed in a
student-authored comment published in the Fordham Law
Review.5 9 Although there had been two hundred or more
manufacturers of DES, there were eleven named defendants. Of
those, the five respondents before the California Supreme CourtAbbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly and Company, E.R. Squibb and
Sons, The Upjohn Company, and Rexall Drug Company 6o-had
commanded a market share that amounted to ninety percent. 61
The court considered and rejected a number of approaches
including the enterprise liability theory announced in Hall.62
Instead, the court announced a "market-share liability" approach
and held that it was:
reasonable in the present context to measure the likelihood
that any of the defendants supplied the product which
allegedly injured plaintiff by the percentage which the DES
ENvT'L. L. 181, 203-04 (1993) (explaining that "[s]ome toxic substances
produce so-called 'signature diseases' which are rare diseases associated with
exposure to a particular substance that rarely occur in the non-exposed
population. The incidence of the background risk for signature diseases is
virtually zero; for example, asbestosis and mesothelioma are signature
diseases of asbestos exposure and clear cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina of
DES exposure. They have been discovered by cluster analysis and their
presence enables plaintiffs exposed to those substances to establish causation
without the usual controversies. . .
55. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 935.
56. Id. at 932.
57. Id. at 926.
58. See, e.g., McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 734 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1978) (explaining that the "identity of the manufacturer must be
ascertained and proved.").
59. Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise
Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 964-67 (1978).
60. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926 n.4.
61. Id. at 937.
62. Id. at 935.
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sold by each of them for the purpose of preventing
miscarriage bears to the entire production of the drug sold by
all for that purpose.
Each defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the
judgment represented by its share of that market unless it
demonstrates that it could not have made the product which
caused plaintiffs injuries. Under this approach, each
manufacturer's liability would approximate its responsibility
for the injuries caused by its own products.63
A number of justifications for the new approach were listed.
These included the idea that "[t]he manufacturer is in the best
position to discover and guard against defects in its products and
to warn of harmful effects .

.

. [and] holding it liable for defects and

failure to warn of harmful effects will provide an incentive to
product safety."6 4 However, at its heart was the purely
instrumentalist view that:
From a broader policy standpoint, defendants are better able
to bear the cost of injury resulting from the manufacture of a
defective product. As was said by Justice Traynor in Escola,
"[the] cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be
an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a
needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of
doing business."65
4.

The Reaction to InstrumentalistStrict Liability

The idea that personal responsibility was to be excluded from
the assignment of tort liability met with a storm of protest.66 Only
two years after deciding Beshada,the New Jersey court was forced
to retreat and permit a state-of-the-art defense, at least in failureto-warn cases. 6 1 In Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co.,68 the court, expressing
63. Id. at 937.
64. Id. at 936.
65. Id. (citing and quoting Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436,
441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
66. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 35, at 121-22 (asserting that, "I do not
want strict liability to be used in toxic pharmaceutical cases. It was done in
Beshada and the result in that case was not a good one. Beshada stands alone,
and it should. I call it 'The Plague Ship Beshada' because I hope it never docks
at another shore again."). See infra note 67.
67. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (N.J. 1984). In
the course of decision, the court noted that "[miany commentators have
criticized this aspect of the Beshada reasoning and the public policies on which
it is based" and cited: Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case
Against Comment K and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 87782 (1983); Victor E. Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate
Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892, 901-05
(1983); John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge
UnavailablePrior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 754-56 (1983); William
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a widely-held view, called the enterprise liability theory of Hall
"repugnant to the most basic tenets of tort law."69 Few, if any,
subsequent cases supported the approach. 70
Sindell too found little long-standing support. In Brown v.

Superior Court,71 the California Supreme Court, now composed
very differently than at the time of the Sindell decision,72 limited
the earlier holding. 73 By the mid to late 1980s, the tide had turned.
In Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 74 for example, the Iowa Supreme
Court described what had happened in Sindell and other cases
following it as "courts develop[ing] theories which in one way or
another provided plaintiffs recovery of loss by a kind of courtconstructed insurance plan [with the result] that manufacturers
are required to pay or contribute to payment for injures which
their product may not have caused."75 Attempts to utilize market
share or industry-wide liability in asbestos and other mass tort
litigation found virtually no success. 76
R. Murray, Jr., Comment, Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of
Scientifically Undiscoverable Product Defects, 71 GEO. L.J. 1635 (1983); Robert
D. Casale, Comment, Beshada v. Johns Manville Products Corp.: Adding
Uncertainty to Injury, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 982, 1008-15 (1983); Robert D.
Towey, Note, Products Liability - Strict-Liability in Tort-State-of-the-Art
Defense Inapplicable in Design Defect Cases, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 625
(1983) (form of citations altered from original).
68. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
69. Id. at 1017.
70. See, e.g., Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 495 A.2d 963, 971
n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (noting that enterprise liability "as embodied in Hall
has now been rejected by virtually every other jurisdiction confronted with
this issue.") (citing cases).
71. Brown v. Super. Ct., 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
72. Justice Stanley Mosk authored the opinion of the court in both cases,
however, the other six justices sitting when Brown was decided had joined the
court after the decision in Sindell. Id. at 473; Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925.
73. Brown, 751 P.2d at 484-87 (holding market-share theory cannot be used
under a fraud or breach of warranty theory and further holding that
defendants, under a market-share theory, were not jointly and severally liable,
an issue left open in Sindell).
74. Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986).
75. Id. at 76.
76. See, e.g., M. Stuart Madden & Jamie Holian, Defendant Indeterminacy:
New Wine into Old Skins, 67 LA. L. REV. 785, 804 (2007) explaining:
[I]n Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., another vaccine case, the court
reemphasized and hammered home that market share liability should
not apply to a nongeneric "defective batch" vaccine case, despite any
difficulties of identification. The court held that recovery could not be
had under market share or any other collective liability theory where
the action was based on an allegedly defective batch of the vaccine and
not on any joint or collective action of the manufacturers that resulted in
a generically defective vaccine.
Probably the most conspicuous category of cases in which market share
or related liability theories failed to gain a foothold has been that of
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But why? Apparently, the answer lies in a broad-based
commitment to principles of traditional non-instrumentalist
negligence theory as the underpinning of the tort system. Thus,
one can see not only that courts negatively respond to strict
liability, but also the emergence of a body of scholarship reacting
negatively to it. For example, David Owen, a leading products
liability scholar and commentator, argued not only had the
pendulum swing from negligence to strict liability begun its
inevitable swing back,77 but fault-based liability had a
philosophical and moral basis that strict liability lacked.7 8
At least two descriptive models capture the noninstrumentalist conception of negligence law. First, what is
commonly referred to a corrective justice theory-or at least parts
of it-seem to fit the bill, though it is easy to be misled given the
extensive debate as to what should or should not be included
within its rubric.79 Secondly, as Patrick Kelley described and
analyzed it, common-law negligence principles freed from the
instrumentalism grafted onto the basic theory by Oliver Wendell
Holmes,8 0 seems to broadly support or complement corrective
asbestos litigation. The courts overwhelmingly have found that, as
asbestos is not a single mineral but instead a group of several different
ones, it is not a single-formula, fungible product that might permit
application of market share liability. There are six different asbestos
silicates used in industrial applications, and each presents a distinct
degree of toxicity in accordance with the shape and aerodynamics of the
individual fibers.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
77. David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703, 703-04 (1992).
78. David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Product Liability Law:
Toward First Principles,68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 427-94 (1993).
79. The best-known debate between corrective justice theorists is that
between Jules Coleman and Ernest Weinrib. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, On
the Moral Argument of the Fault System, 71 J. PHIL. 473 (1974); Jules L.
Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421
(1982); Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67
IND. L.J. 349 (1992); Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective
Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 427 (1992); Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and
Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407 (1987); Ernest J. Weinrib,
Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1989); Ernest J. Weinrib,
The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 MCGILL L.J. 403 (1989).
80. Patrick J. Kelley, Who Decides? Community Safety Conventions at the
Heart of Tort Liability,38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 315, 345-46 (1990) explaining:
Holmes theorized that the "secret root" of judicial decisions, rarely
articulated by judges, is legislative policy: "considerations of what is
expedient for the community concerned." . . . Regardless of what judges
say are the reasons for their decisions, the only real basis for judicial
decision is public policy: consideration of the effect on the community of
deciding the case one way or the other. The best decision is the one that
influences future human action in ways most conducive to overall
community welfare.
See also generally, Patrick J. Kelley, A CriticalAnalysis of Holmes's Theory
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justice description of the common understanding of the nature and
function of tort law.81
The insistence on fault-based liability has, among some
segments of the American populace, moved it beyond its
traditional status as a question of public policy, quite literally, into
an article of religious faith. 82 Thus, a corrective justice
underpinning for the obligation to compensate for unintended
harm is asserted by the Christian right. Ronald Rychlak,
discussing the concept of monetary damages paid by the
wrongdoer to the victim to make him or her whole, explains:
This concept has an extensive history, going back as far as
the Old Testament legal codes contained in the book of
Exodus. For example, Exodus 21 and 22 contain parameters
for the compensation of both individuals who have been
injured and the violations of personal property. The lex
talionis, or law of retribution, is famously contained in the
phrases: "life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for
hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for
stripe" (Exodus 21:23-25 NAB). The general principle behind
this law is one of reciprocity, which holds that the
punishment or restitution for the wrong is to be appropriately
linked to the extent of the harm or damage. 83
Not only is corrective ("commutative") justice critically
important, 84 but it is asserted to be more important than

of Torts, 61 WASH. U. L. Q. 681 (1983).
81. See infra text accompanying notes 118-19.
82. See, e.g., Samuel Gregg, Tort Reform and Thomas More: Lessons from a
8,
2004),
INST.
(Sept.
Christian
Lawyer,
ACTION
http://www.acton.org/pub/commentary/2004/09/08/tort-reform-and-thomasmore-lessons-christian-lawy; Jordan Ballor, Touting Tort Reform, ACTION
INST.
(Mar.
24,
2004),
http://www.acton.org/pub/commentary/
2004/03/24/touting-tort-reform; Ronald J. Rychlak, Tort Reform as a Moral
(Apr.
6,
2005),
http://www.acton.org/
Issue,
ACTION
INST.
pub/commentary/2005/04/06 /tort-reform-moral-issue.
83. RONALD RYCHLAK, TRIAL BY FURY 8-9 (2004).
84. My equation of corrective justice and commutative justice may be a
little imprecise, but sufficient for our purposes here. Aquinas distinguished
commutative justice and distributive justice.
For distributive justice directs distributions, while commutative justice
directs commutations that can take place between two persons. Of these
some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are involuntary when
anyone uses another man's chattel, person, or work against his will, and
this may be done secretly by fraud, or openly by violence. On either case
the offence may be committed against the other man's chattel or person,
or against a person connected with him. If the offence is against his
chattel and this be taken secretly, it is called "theft," if openly, it is
called "robbery." If it be against another man's person, it may affect
either the very substance of his person, or his dignity. If it be against
the substance of his person, a man is injured secretly if he is
treacherously slain, struck or poisoned, and openly, if he is publicly

2011]

Tort Reform and Implied Conflict Preemption

843

distributive justice. Again, as explained by Rychlak:
The reason why commutative justice is so important in
Catholic doctrine is that it most clearly impacts individuals,
not just the State. Commutative justice "requires
safeguarding property rights, paying debts, and fulfilling
obligations freely contracted." Assurance that the State will
enforce these rights helps shape the expectations and
attitudes of the citizens in a way that lead to the proper
functioning of the State. In this way, "Distributive justice is
possible only upon the foundation of commutative justice.
[C]ommutative justice is not only fundamental, but is also
prior to distributive justice."86
Thus, to the extent that liability without fault is based on
principles of distributive justice, it follows that it must necessarily
be subordinate to a system of fault-based liability. Moreover, the
Christian right, and of course many others who do not share their
theology, are firmly committed to free market enterprise and the
advancement of corporate interests. 6 To the extent that religious
and economic convictions coincide, one ends up with a broad
societal commitment to traditional negligence and/or corrective
justice that prohibits (or at least condemns) the imposition of
liability on an entire industry for the act of one (unidentified)
participant in that industry.87
slain, imprisoned, struck or maimed. If it be against his personal
dignity, a man is injured secretly by false witness, detractions and so
forth, whereby he is deprived of his good name, and openly, by being
accused in a court of law, or by public insult. If it be against a personal
connection, a man is injured in the person of his wife, secretly (for the
most part) by adultery, in the person of his slave, if the latter be induced
to leave his master: which things can also be done openly. The same
applies to other personal connections, and whatever injury may be
committed against the principal, may be committed against them also.
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Vol. 3 (Part II, Second Section)
1447-48 (1911).
85. Rychlak, supra note 83, at 14 (quoting the Catechism of the Catholic
Church 2411 and Stephen J. Grabill, Kevin E. Schmiesing and Gloria L.
Zuniga, DOING JUSTICE TO JUSTICE: COMPETING FRAMEWORKS OF
INTERPRETATION IN CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHICS, VOL. 4, CHRISTIAN SOCIAL
THOUGHT SERIES 40-41 (2002)).
86. See, e.g., David C. Barker & Christopher Jan Carman, The Spirit of
Capitalism?Religious Doctrine, Values, and Economic Attitude Constructs, 22
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 1, 21 (2000) (finding that "those who adhere to
conservative Protestant doctrine-namely fundamentalist, evangelical, and
oftentimes charismatic Protestantism . .. inspires economic individualism as
manifested through opposition to taxes, spending, and governmental activism
in economic affairs."); see also John C. Green and James L. Guth, The
Christian Right in the Republican Party: The Case of Pat Robertson's
Supporters, 50 J. OF POLITICS 150, 159 (1988) (finding that "approval of party
economic stands links the Christian Right and GOP regulars .... ).
87. This raises the question of whether that same commitment to principle
should also preclude the regulation of an entire industry from immunizing one
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The Transitionfrom Strict Liability to Negligence

In many ways, the Products Liability Restatement,8 8 begun in
199289 and published in 1998, is a transitional document. In its
most important aspects, it rejects strict liability, though often
retaining strict liability language. For example, Section 1 subjects
those in "the business of selling or otherwise distributing products"
to liability if the product is defective.90 Section 2 then defines
defectiveness in design and failure-to-warn cases in terms of
negligence. Thus, Section 2 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or
distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective
in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions
or warnings. A product:
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by
the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller
or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain
of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe . . .;91

Although different tests are specified for use in cases
involving of some special products such as food, medical devices,
and pharmaceuticals, 92 Section 2 is intended to apply generally to
most manufactured goods. The test for design defect contemplated
by the Reporters and adopted by the ALI involves the application
of a risk-utility balancing approach. Comment d explains:
Subsection (b) adopts a reasonableness ("risk-utility
balancing") test as the standard for judging the defectiveness
of product designs. More specifically, the test is whether a
reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have
reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product

tortfeasor participant in that industry from tort liability to a specific victim of
its (alleged) misconduct.
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. (1998).
89. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Institute Announces Advisory Committee
for Restatement Product Liability Revision, BNA PROD. LIAB. DAILY, June 11,
1992.
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (1998) (nonmanufacturing defendants are thus held liable as sellers even if they had no
responsibility for the existence of a defect).
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998).
92. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1998) Section 7
provides for a consumer exrectation test in the case of food and Section 6
provides for a special test in cases involving drugs and medical devices. The
test for drugs and medical devices remains quite controversial and some
commentators have urged the application of Section 2's general standard in
those cases as well. See e.g., George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 109 YALE L.J. 1087 (2000).
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and, if so, whether the omission of the alternative design by
the seller or a predecessor in the distributive chain rendered
the product not reasonably safe. (This is the primary, but not
the exclusive, test for defective design.) Under prevailing
rules concerning allocation of burden of proof, the plaintiff
must prove that such a reasonable alternative was, or
reasonably could have been, available at time of sale or
distribution.
Assessment of a product design in most instances requires a
comparison between an alternative design and the product
design that caused the injury, undertaken from the viewpoint
of a reasonable person. That approach is also used in
administering the traditional reasonableness standard in
negligence. 93
To assist in the performance of the risk-utility analysis,
comment f sets out and discusses the factors to be taken into
consideration. It states:
The factors include, among others, the magnitude and
probability of the foreseeable risks of harm, the instructions
and warnings accompanying the product, and the nature and
strength of consumer expectations regarding the product,
including expectations arising from product portrayal and
marketing. The relative advantages and disadvantages of the
product as designed and as it alternatively could have been
designed may also be considered. Thus, the likely effects of
the alternative design on production costs; the effects of the
alternative design on product longevity, maintenance, repair,
and esthetics; and the range of consumer choice among
products are factors that may be taken into account. A
plaintiff is not necessarily required to introduce proof on all
of these factors; their relevance, and the relevance of other
factors, will vary from case to case. Moreover, the factors
interact with one another. For example, evidence of the
magnitude and probability of foreseeable harm may be offset
by evidence that the proposed alternative design would
reduce the efficiency and the utility of the product. On the
other hand, evidence that a proposed alternative design
would increase production costs may be offset by evidence
that product portrayal and marketing created substantial
expectations of performance or safety, thus increasing the
probability of foreseeable harm. Depending on the mix of
these factors, a number of variations in the design of a given
product may meet the test in Subsection (b).94
Although there are significant variations in the design-defect

93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB.
(internal cross-references omitted).
94. Id. cmt. f.

§

2,

cmt.

d (1998)
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approaches adopted in the various states, the overwhelming
majority utilize the Restatement's risk-utility approach for most
cases, or something similar to it.95 However, simply characterizing
the liability standard in design cases as requiring the utilization of
a "cost-benefit" or "risk-utility" approach is misleading.
In an important article on the topic, David Owen
distinguished what he described as "macro" and "micro" costbenefit analyses. Regarding the use of a "macro-balancing" test, he
explained:
A survey of balancing test definitions for design defectiveness
presently used by appellate courts across the nation shows a
diversity of approaches, but it also reveals a disturbing trend.
A definition now recurring with enough frequency to be
characterized as dominant may be summarized as follows: A
design is defective if the product's risks exceed its utility.
Despite its increasing popularity, however, this formulation
of the test is flawed as an adjudicatory standard for
determining design defectiveness. Defining liability in this
manner may retain linguistic fidelity to the name by which
the test increasingly is known-"risk-utility"- but it is
highly problematic as a liability standard in that it appears
to call for a balancing of all the risks of "the product" against
all the product's "utility" or "benefits." This meaning, clearly
implied by many court definitions, sometimes is made
explicit, as in one court's recent formulation in terms of
"balancing the overall risk and utility of a product."96
Rather than utilize this macro approach, trial lawyers
typically can and should utilize a "micro-balancing" approach
under which the plaintiff is required to propose an alternative
design which, he or she will argue, the defendant should have
adopted.97 Thus, the micro-balancing test, as Professor Owen
explains it, could be formulated in a few different ways including
as one of the following:
A product is defective in design if the safety benefits from

95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2, Reporters' Note to cmt.
d (1998) (although specifically insisting that the extensive citation of authority
"is not intended to provide a state-by-state compendium[,] it comes pretty
close.").
96. David G. Owen, Toward a Proper Test for Design Defectiveness: "MicroBalancing"Costs and Benefits, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1672-73 (1997) (footnotes

omitted).
97. So-called "product category liability," i.e., the imposition of liability on a
type of product notwithstanding the absence of an alternative design was
rejected by the Restatement in all but the most extreme cases. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. e, Ill. 5 (conceding that
in the case of a prank exploding cigar that causes injury, "[t]he utility ... is so
low and the risk of injury is so high as to warrant a conclusion that the cigar is
defective and should not have been marketed at all.").
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altering the design as proposed by the plaintiff were
foreseeably greater than the resulting costs, including any
diminished usefulness or diminished safety.9 8
[or]
A product is defective in design if it was not designed with
reasonable safety, such that the safety benefits from altering
the design, as proposed by the plaintiff, were foreseeably
greater than the resulting costs, including any diminished
usefulness or diminished safety.99
In explaining his preference for this second formulation,
Professor Owen notes that the "definition is plainly softer, for the
'reasonable safety' bough adds wiggle room for cases where even
the [first] . .. micro-balance definition .

.

. appears too narrow to

include certain issues in the case." 0 0
To illustrate what I take to be his basic point, consider the
case of Fallon v. Clifford B. Hannay & Sons, Inc. 0 1 In that case,

the plaintiff, a propane gas delivery man, was running with a hose
in the course of delivering gas. 102 While running, the hose snagged
and stopped his forward progress suddenly, resulting in back
injuries. 0 3 The defendant was the manufacturer of the reel around
which the propane hose was wound. The plaintiffs argument was
that the reel should have been equipped with a "'guide master,' a
piece of optional equipment manufactured and offered for sale by
defendant with the power reel."104 Moreover, it was claimed that if
the guide had been provided, the hose would not have tangled and
the injury would not have occurred. 0 5
Although the actual price of the hose guide is not provided
and it is impossible on the facts recited by the court to know either
the severity of the plaintiffs injuries or the frequency with which
such injuries occur,106 assume for the sake of argument that under
a purely mathematical cost-benefit analysis, it was foreseeable
that the cost of accident avoidance (adding the guide) was less
than the discounted magnitude of the harm. Would the court
necessarily have to find for the plaintiff?
Under Owen's first formulation of the micro-balance, it would.
As long as the injury cost that would be avoided exceeds the cost of
98. Owen, supranote 96, at 1690.
99. Id. at 1691.
100. Id.
101. Fallon v. Clifford B. Hannay & Sons, Inc., 153 A.D.2d 95 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989).

102. Id. at 97.

103. Id. at 98.
104. Id.

105. Id. at 99.
106. Id. at 101 (accepting the defendant's proof that "the danger of injury

was insubstantial.").
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design alternatives, the defectiveness element is established.
Under the "softer" second version, however, a court could (as this
particular court did) conclude that even without the addition of
what was clearly a feasible alternative design, the product was
reasonably safe-i.e., safe enough.107 In an appropriate case, such
as Fallon, non-defectiveness might be found as a matter of law. 08
In other words, when the "micro-balancing" test is utilized by the
courts in these cases, it is, as Owen rightfully argues it should be,
a very traditional negligence test under which monetized costs and
benefits have a role to play, but the essential question remains
whether the defendant behaved reasonably under all of the
circumstances that are deemed relevant to the decision of tort
cases.109

C. More on the Underpinningsof Negligence Law
1. Corrective Justice
Negligence, however, is only coherent and acceptable as the
basis for requiring compensation if certain elements are found to
exist. First, of course, there can be no obligation to compensate in
the absence of wrongdoing or fault. Second, the party to be
compensated must have been harmed by the act or omission of the
defendant, i.e., causation must be established. Strict liability,
which eliminates wrongdoing, and theories such as enterprise
liability, which eliminate the need to show a particular defendant's
conduct was wrongful and/or eliminate the need to show the causal
connection between a particular defendant's act or omission and
the harm to the plaintiff, were unacceptable to many precisely
because those theories sought to discard essential elements. 110
Moreover, under principles of corrective justice, there is a third
requirement; the payment of compensation by the harm-doer is
necessary to restore a preexisting equality between that
wrongdoer and the victim of the wrongdoing. 1 ' As Ernest Weinrib

107. Id. at 100 (finding "the facts and reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the evidence submitted in support of defendant's motion negated
plaintiffs claim that the Hannay Reel without a guide master was not
reasonably safe.").
108. Id. at 102 (finding "[iun the absence of such a prima facie showing that
defendant's reel was not reasonably safe, plaintiff failed to create an issue of
fact precluding summary judgment.").
109. See infra notes 242-54 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
111. Since the payment of compensation for harm only serves to restore the
status quo ante, some have argued that preexisting inequalities are
perpetuated. From this claim arises the additional claim that corrective justice
then becomes a form of distributional justice, rather than a wholly
independent basis for normative assertions. See Peter Benson, The Basis of
Corrective Justice and Its Relationship to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV.
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posited, the relationship between the wrongdoer and victim is,
therefore, essential. He explained:
Aristotle was the first to notice that private law exhibited a
rationality internal to the relationship of doer and sufferer,
and he demonstrated that this rationality, which he termed
corrective justice, was distinct from that governing
considerations of distribution and assessments of virtue. At
the heart of corrective justice was a special kind of equality
that abstracted from the particular characteristics of the
interacting parties. Aristotle conceived of the private law
wrong as violating this equality, and of the award of damages
as restoring it. His was thus the first analysis in our
philosophical tradition both of the distinctiveness of the
plaintiff-defendant relationship and of the role of
adjudication in vindicating the relationship's moral
dimension. 112
Weinrib argued that negligence law, properly understood,
applied this corrective justice principle and was dependent on the
understanding of the relationship between a wrongdoer and the
victim of that wrongdoers misconduct. He wrote:
Tort litigation, accordingly, effects a transfer of wealth from
the defendant to the plaintiff that retraces the moral
relationship created by the wrongful injury. The plaintiff
cannot recover from just anyone who was negligent, but must
sue the particular party who wrongfully inflicted this
particular injury. The relational aspect of wrongdoing fuses
the defendant's doing and the plaintiffs suffering of wrongful
injury into a normatively significant unit. Because this
relational aspect is confined to the litigants, the transfer of
wealth through the litigational mode of annulment is
insulated from the distributional considerations that
13
implicate the relative holdings of a wider range of persons.1
Applying the relational aspect of negligence law to perhaps
the most famous tort case in American jurisprudence-Palsgraf v.
Long Island RailroadCo.-Weinrib explained:
Since the negligence could be defined only in terms of the
package's owner, the plaintiff was suing for harm done to her
as a result of a wrong to someone else.
Cardozo's majority opinion emphasizes the relational quality
of negligence. In construing negligence as the commission of a
wrong that signifies the violation of another's right Cardozo
makes the wrongfulness of negligence embrace both the actor
515, 529 (1992). A full discussion of the underlying philosophical debate,
however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
112. Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
407, 449-50 (1987) (footnote omitted).
113. Id. at 434.
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and the sufferer. The wrongfulness of unreasonably imposing
on another the possibility of injury is correlative to the right
of the other to be free from this imposition, and so the
compensation that plaintiff seeks from the defendant is a
vindication of her right. The plaintiffs entitlement to
compensation from the defendant mirrors her status as the
victim of the wrong he has done her. Without such status the
plaintiff cannot win.114
Importantly, in the foregoing, Weinrib apparently assumes,
but does not expand upon, the plaintiffs entitlement to
compensation. In other words, if the necessary relationship of
wrongdoer and victim exists, can the victim rightfully be denied
compensation? 15 Most, though not all, philosophers writing on the
subject argue that there is such an entitlement,1 6 though no
federal court and only a few state courts have so held." 7
2. Negligence as Violation of Community Standards
Negligence, viewed in non-instrumental terms, has long been
considered to be a means of redressing private wrongs between
individuals. As Patrick Kelley explained:
The argument that "duty" is a judicial fiat concealing

114. Id. at 441.
115. As Richard Wright has pointed out, one of the hotly debated issues,
moreover, is whether corrective justice theory requires that "a corrective
justice duty be discharged only by the party who is subject to that duty" (as
opposed to some third party or entity). Richard W. Wright, Substantive
Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 625, 703 (1992). He concludes:
Such a requirement would seem to apply only when the appropriate
mode of rectification is punishment. When the appropriate mode of
rectification is compensation for the unjust loss, rather than or in
addition to punishment, corrective justice merely establishes the duty
of the party who caused the unjust loss to see to it that the required
compensation occurs. There is nothing in corrective justice which
prevents that duty from being discharged voluntarily, on behalf of the
party with the duty, by someone else .g. that party's insurer of rich
aunt.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Although I argued years ago that the dominant public
understanding of tort was, in fact, punitive, that claim is beyond the scope of
this paper. But see Martin A. Kotler, Utility, Autonomy and Motive: A
Descriptive Model of the Development of Tort Doctrine, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1231
(1990).
116. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, Corrective Injustice to Corrective Justice, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 56 (1991) (stating "[flor more traditional corrective
justice theorists [than Coleman], such as Aristotle, Holmes, George Fletcher,
Richard Epstein, and Ernest Weinrib, have thought of the principle of
corrective justice as demanding not just that innocent victims of culpablycaused losses be compensated, but that such victims be compensated by those
who have culpably harmed them.") (footnotes omitted).
See also Wright, supra note 115 (noting duties of corrective justice).
117. See infra text accompanying notes 144-56.
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underlying policy judgments comes naturally to modern tort
theorists, for it embodies the prevailing view that duties are
positive legal duties imposed by legislators or judges based on
their views of desirable social policy. This modern view,
however, ignores an earlier understanding of the appropriate
bases for judicial decision-the understanding prevalent at
the time the general duty of care pleading first appeared.
Under that view, judges were to look to the preexisting
customs and mores of the community to resolve disputes. The
custom of the realm, they thought, was the common law.
From this, one may conclude that the early duty of care
pleading was understood as a method of referring in a
general way to the specific preexisting customs, conventions,
and coordinating practices of the community. Understood in
that way, the duty terminology is not an empty formula. If
tort liability is imposed to redress a private wrong, defined by
reference to the practical coordination norms of the
community, it seems only natural to characterize that wrong
as [sic] breach of duty owed by defendant to plaintiff. You
wrong someone when you fail to give him what is "due him,"
that is, when you fail to fulfill your duty to him. There is no
circularity . . . here, because the courts reason from pre-

judicial community-defined obligations, based on the accepted
coordination norms of the community, to a conclusion about
legally redressing a wrong understood as a breach of that
118
community-defined obligation.
Kelley goes on to explain that community norms or customs
may or may not "impose a duty to all the world," since it is entirely
possible that the custom as it has developed may only require one
119
to protect another within the context of a specified relationship.
3. Per Se Liability
Of course, while application of community standards of
reasonableness by a jury performing its normative law-making
function is the paradigmatic illustration of negligence, it has long
been accepted that there may be other sources of behavioral
standards. 120 Thus, behavioral standards contained in statutes,
ordinances and administrative regulations may, in appropriate
cases, be utilized in lieu of the ordinary reasonable prudent person
standard.121
Inasmuch as legislative bodies can, and often do, explicitly
create new torts and provide damages remedies if they choose to
118. Kelley, supra note 80, at 355-56.

119. Id. at 357.
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965) (naming "legislative
enactment or administrative regulation . . . [or] judicial decision" in addition to
trial judge or jury).
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 (2005).

852

The John MarshallLaw Review

[44:827

do so, the relevance of the fact that a defendant has violated a
statute, ordinance or regulation which does not, by its terms,
provide a damage remedy for someone harmed by the violation has
always been less than clear.122 Obviously, in a negligence case the
defendant's compliance or noncompliance with community or
industry custom may have a bearing on the reasonableness of the
conduct. 123 Although the theoretical relevance of custom in strict
liability cases was less clear, courts utilizing various explanations
rapidly came to accept its probative value in those cases as well.124
If there is a statute or regulation, its existence may help to
establish the content of the custom, at least arguably on the theory
that most members of the relevant community customarily follow
the law.125 Furthermore, in some states compliance or
noncompliance with the statutory or regulatory standard of
behavior is deemed relevant to the reasonableness of the
defendant's conduct,126 separate and apart from the question of
122. Although, it should be noted that Kelley argues that the statutory
liability rules cases (i.e., negligence per se cases) "provide[] a key to
understanding the relationship between community standards of conduct and
the individual, private wrongs redressible by tort liability." The negligence per
se requirement that that statute be enacted to protect a class of persons of
which the plaintiff is a member from a specific hazard the statute is enacted to
avoid, can also be used "to determine when breach of any conventional rule or
practice is a private wrong to [the] plaintiff." Kelley, supra note 80, at 363.
123. See The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.)
(famously noting "[t]here are, no doubt, cases where courts seem to make the
general practice of the calling the standard of proper diligence; we have indeed
given some currency to the notion ourselves. Indeed in most cases reasonable
prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a
whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available
devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages.
Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so
imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their
omission.").
124. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976)
(finding custom evidence relevant to consumer expectation under Maryland
law); Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 1983)
(Garwood, J., concurring) ("industry custom will usually tend to show the
collective judgment of the industry on the subject, and in this respect it has
the same character of relevance as a professional society standard,though the
relevance is more attenuated since factors other than product safety are more
likely to influence the custom than the standard.") (predicting Tex. Law);
Alevromagiros v. Hechinger Co., 993 F.2d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the plaintiff "must establish the violation of industry or government
standards, or prove that consumer expectations have risen above such
standards.") (Va. Law).
125. See, e.g., Trimarco v. Klein, 436 N.E.2d 502, 506-07 (N.Y. 1982)
(although using the statute which did not, by its terms, apply was property
excluded as it was apt to be prejudicial and confuse the jury).
126. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-105(a) (West 2009) ("Compliance by a
manufacturer or supplier with any federal or state statute or administrative
regulation existing at the time a product was manufactured . . . shall be
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whether the statute permits an inference as to the content of a
custom, and, in those states, violation of a statute or
administrative regulation is simply evidence of negligence.127
A majority of states, however, follow the view expressed by
Roger Traynor that, under at least some circumstances, it is
appropriate for the court to adopt the statutory or regulatory
standard of behavior and use it in lieu of the reasonableness
standard.128 Justice Traynor explained:
A statute that provides for a criminal proceeding only does
not create a civil liability; if there is no provision for a remedy
by civil action to persons injured by a breach of the statute it
is because the Legislature did not contemplate one. A suit for
damages is based on the theory that the conduct inflicting the
injuries is a common-law tort, in this case the failure to
exercise the care of a reasonable man at a boulevard stop.
The significance of the statute in a civil suit for negligence
lies in its formulation of a standard of conduct that the court
adopts in the determination of such liability. The decision as
to what the civil standard should be still rests with the court,
and the standard formulated by a legislative body in a police
regulation or criminal statute becomes the standard to
determine civil liability only because the court accepts it. In
the absence of such a standard the case goes to the jury,
which must determine whether the defendant has acted as a
reasonably prudent man would act in similar circumstances.
The jury then has the burden of deciding not only what the
facts are but what the unformulated standard is of
reasonable conduct. When a legislative body has generalized
a standard from the experience of the community and
prohibits conduct that is likely to cause harm, the court
accepts the formulated standards and applies them. 129
If the standard is adopted and proof of violation is offered,
courts typically either declare that an unexcused violation is

considered as evidence."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.050(1) (West 2010)
(Evidence of custom in the product seller's industry . . . or that the product
was or was not in compliance with new government standards or with new
legislative standards or administrative regulations ... may be considered by
the trier of fact.").
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 14, Reporters' Note to cmt. c (2009).
128. See, e.g., Bier v. Leanna Lakeside Prop. Ass'n, 711 N.E.2d 773, 783 (Ill.
App. 1999) ("The violation does not constitute negligence per se, however;
therefore the defendant may prevail by showing that he acted reasonably
under the circumstances."); Mayor of Balt. v. Hart, 910 A.2d 463, 474 (Md.
2006) ("[T]he Baltimore City Police Department's regulations and guidelines,
as well as State statutes, are relevant to the issue of reasonableness."); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 5.40.050 (West 2009) (limiting negligence per se to small
class of cases).
129. Clinkscales v. Carver, 136 P.2d 777, 778 (Cal. 1943).
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negligence 30 or apply a Thayer or Morgan presumption shifting
the burden of excusing the violation to the defendant (or the
plaintiff in cases of contributory or comparative negligence per
se). 131
In products cases, the violation of an adopted standard goes to
defectiveness rather than reasonableness. Nevertheless, since a
majority of courts and Section 2 of the Products Liability
Restatement define "defectiveness" in design cases in terms of
reasonableness, it comes out in the same place.132 The Products
Liability Restatement section 4(a) asserts that:
In connection with liability for defective design or inadequate
instructions or warnings:
(a) a product's noncompliance with an applicable product
safety statute or administrative regulation renders the
product defective with respect to the risks sought to be
reduced by the statute or regulation . . .

;133

It is important to note, however, that whether the court is
utilizing a common-law reasonableness standard to assess a
defendant's behavior or is adopting a statutory standard of
behavior (but allowing the violator to offer excuses that make the
violation reasonable under the circumstances), the essential
nature of the theory of liability is unchanged. Wrongdoing,
130. Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920) (asserting that "[w]e
think the unexcused omission of the statutory signals is more than some
evidence of negligence. It is negligence in itself.").
131. Although, in a fairly small class of cases, under general tort principles
the judicial adoption of some statutory standards has been found to preclude
the possibility of excuse for noncompliance. Thus, for example, the Second
Restatement notes:
There are statutes which prohibit an act or omission under particular
circumstances, irrespective of whether the actor knows or could in any
possible way learn of the circumstances, or could in any way avoid the
act or omission, or may have any other excuse whatever. Thus statutes
prohibiting the employment of children below a certain age at or about
dangerous machinery usually have been construed to make their
employment a crime, and to result in tort liability, even though the
employer does not know and could not possibly learn that the child is
below the statutory age. The Federal Safety Appliance Act has been
construed to require railroads engaged in interstate commerce to
provide safety devices, such as automatic couplers, in good working
order, for the protection of their employees, and to permit no excuse
because of the failure of the device to operate, or all possible diligence
and care to provide it. Such statutes in reality result in strict liability,
although the courts have continued to speak of liability for negligence.
When they are adopted by the court as defining a standard of conduct
for a tort action, the standard adopted is one of strict liability, and the
statute is still construed to permit no excuse.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A, cmt. c (1965).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 4(a) (1998).
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causation, and relationship between the parties are required as
conditions for the imposition of liability under both approaches. In
fact, under the most commonly accepted theories of negligence per
se, assuming the legislation or regulation is appropriate for
judicial adoption, the case is still controlled by community
standards of behavior, however, it is the legislature "as the
authoritative representative of the community" that initially
defines the standard. 134 Moreover, the ultimate normative
judgment as to the social acceptability of the conduct (perhaps in
light of a proffered excuse) remains vested in the jury.

D. Considerationof the Rights of and Wrongs to Non-Parties:The
Return of Instrumentalism
To the extent that courts lose sight of the importance of
insisting on the existence of a specific relationship between
plaintiff and defendant, the moral justification for shifting the loss
from the victim to a wrongdoer is lost and tort law becomes purely
instrumental-the view which, as previously noted, had been
widely and repeatedly rejected since the mid-1980s. Nevertheless,
one can observe courts reaching this result in recent cases under
at least two circumstances. First, it can occur if the duty issue in
negligence law is viewed purely or primarily as a question of
public policy, rather than as a moral prerequisite. 135 For example,
elsewhere, I criticized the Texas approach to the problem, which
apparently adopts that view. 136 In Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v.
Gomez,13 7 the court considered whether a flint supplier owed a
duty of due care, specifically a duty to warn users of the dangers of
non-use of a respirator.13 8 Although the court frankly
acknowledged that "[tlhere is no question .

.

. that Gomez would

have escaped injury had Humble's bags borne an adequate
9
warning label; he so testified, and the jury believed him."13 The
court insisted, however, there was a more important question:
[A]s we have already explained, the inquiry for purposes of
determining duty must be an objective one with a view of the
industry as a whole. A supplier with a duty to warn is liable
for each injury caused by its failure to do so. Whether such a
duty exists, however, depends in part on whether injury in
general is likely to result from the absence of warning.

134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 14 cmt. c (2010).

135. Id. § 7(b) (accepting the idea that duty may be decided as a matter of
policy).
136. Martin A. Kotler, The Myth of Individualism and the Appeal of Tort
Reform, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 779, 834-36 (2007).
137. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 146 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 2004).
138. Id. at 172.

139. Id. at 192.
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On the record before us, nothing more can be said than that
one supplier's failure to warn one worker increased the
likelihood of his injury. A legal duty resulting in enormous
liability cannot be imposed on an entire industry on the basis
of a fluke. 140
In other words, rather than attempting to determine the
parties' rights as to one another, as demanded by principles of
corrective justice and the original non-instrumentalist conception
of negligence, the court has reinstituted an instrumentalist
approach to tort much like that which was rejected in the 1980s, 141
only now the courts act so as to favor those alleged to be
wrongdoers, rather than victims. The instrumentalist approach is,
accordingly, brought to bear to achieve a no liability regime based
on judicial conceptions of social or economic policy, whereas in
earlier days it was used to achieve a strict liability regime. One
would think that to those morally or philosophically committed to
fault-based liability, the same reasons which served to
delegitimate strict liability rules, would now serve to delegitimate
no liability rules. 142
In addition to the "no-duty" cases, the adoption of no-liability
rules can be seen in cases where courts elect to defer to
administrative regulation and, more importantly for our purposes
here, in some of the implied preemption cases. 143
III.

THE UNENFORCEABLE "RIGHT" TO SUE

A. Legislative Power to Abolish Tort

While the pendulum of products liability law was swinging
from negligence, to instrumentalist strict liability, to negligence, a
number of other legal developments occurred that ultimately led to
the situation in which we currently find ourselves. The first dealt
with the status of the right to bring suit in tort and legislatures'
power to abrogate such a right. In fact, the problem can actually
be traced to developments that predated the development of strict
liability doctrine, though its modern incarnation seems inevitably
linked to the instrumentalism of the 1960s, '70s, and '80s, and the
legislative push for tort reform that followed in response.
The basic question was whether the right to compensation in
140. Id. at 192-93 (emphasis in original) (apparently conflating the question
of duty and liability).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 66-87.
142. The term 'legitimacy" as used here simply refers to public normative
acceptance of judicial action. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF
LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 16 (1990) (defining legitimacy as "the property
of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward
compliance on those addressed normatively.").
143. See infra text accompanying notes 302-16.
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tort for harm caused by another should be recognized as a
fundamental right, constitutionally beyond the power of
legislatures to abolish. The question initially became one of
considerable importance in response to the enactment of workers'
compensation legislation during the early decades of the twentieth
century. Although some of the early cases found the institution of
workers' compensation to be constitutionally impermissible, 144
later decisions permitted it, while continuing to question whether
states had the constitutional authority to abrogate the right to sue
without providing some alternative. Thus, for example in New
York Central Railroad Co. v. White,145 after noting that:

The close relation of the rules governing responsibility as
between employer and employee to the fundamental rights of
liberty and property is, of course, recognized. But those rules,
as guides of conduct, are not beyond alteration by legislation
in the public interest. No person has a vested interest in any
rule of law, entitling him to insist that it shall remain
unchanged for his benefit.146
The court continued:
Nor is it necessary, for the purposes of the present case, to
say that a state might, without violence to the constitutional
guaranty of "due process of law," suddenly set aside all
common-law rules respecting liability as between employer
and employee, without providing a reasonably just substitute.
Considering the vast industrial organization of the state of
New York, for instance, with hundreds of thousands of plants
and millions of wage earners, each employer, on the one
hand, having embarked his capital, and each employee, on
the other, having taken up his particular mode of earning a
livelihood, in reliance upon the probable permanence of an
established body of law governing the relation, it perhaps
may be doubted whether the state could abolish all rights of
action, on the one hand, or all defenses, on the other, without
setting up something adequate in their stead. No such
question is here presented, and we intimate no opinion upon
it. The statute under consideration sets aside one body of
rules only to establish another system in its place.147
The issue seemingly disappeared for a while as a fundamental
rights issue as substantive due process, more or less, fell out of
favor.148 It reappeared again in the early 1970s when various
states enacted no-fault insurance systems to replace tort litigation.

144. E.g., Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1912).
145. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
146. Id. at 197-98.
147. Id. at 201.
148. Unless you characterize Griswold and its progeny as substantive due
process cases.
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Relying on the earlier workers' compensation decisions, a number
of state courts upheld the legislation, again seeming to insist that
there be some quid pro quo for the loss of the right to sue.149
The legislatures' power to deprive litigants of a right to sue
was then repeatedly tested during the ensuing years as successive
waves of medical malpractice and other tort reform swept the
nation, but, by that time, things had changed. As instrumentalist
views of tort began to dominate, the right to sue was relegated to
the status of economic right and, as such, the overwhelming view
was that it could be abrogated by the legislature as long as there
was a rational relationship between the asserted legislative goal
and the means chosen to accomplish it.
As to the need for some quid pro quo, most, though not all,
states adopted the view that it either was not required at all or, if
it was, broad social benefit would suffice to meet the requirement.
Thus, for example, in upholding medical malpractice reform
legislation, the California court stated:
[i]t is well established that a plaintiff has no vested property
right in a particular measure of damages, and that the
Legislature possesses broad authority to modify the scope
and nature of such damages. Since the demise of the
substantive due process analysis of Lochner v. New York it
has been clear that the constitutionality of measures
affecting such economic rights under the due process clause
does not depend on a judicial assessment of the justifications
for the legislation or of the wisdom or fairness of the
enactment [i.e., the 'adequacy' of the quid pro quo]. So long as
the measure is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest, policy determinations as to the need for, and the
desirability of, the enactment are for the Legislature.150
The court dismissed the quid pro quo requirement simply
asserting:
[E]ven if due process principles required some "quid pro quo"
to support the statute, it would be difficult to say that the
preservation of a viable medical malpractice insurance
149. See, e.g., Gentile v. Altermatt, 363 A.2d 1, 15 (Conn. 1975) ("Standing

alone, the nonexempted plaintiffs alternate remedies may not equate with the
foregoing tort remedies. It must be recognized, however, that the law requires
a reasonable alternative and not an exact equation of remedies. Thus for each
remedy or item of damage existing under the prior fault system, it is not
required that that item be duplicated under the act but that the bulk of
remedies under the act be of such significance that a court is justified in
viewing this legislation on the whole as a substitute, the benefits from which
are sufficient to tolerate the removal of the prior cause of action."); see also
cases cited infra note 151.
150. Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 695 P.2d 665, 679 (Cal. 1985) (emphasis
in the original) (quoting Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Cmty. Hosp., 683 P.2d 670,
676 (Cal. 1984) (other citations omitted)).
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industry in the state was not an adequate benefit for the
detriment the legislation imposes on malpractice plaintiffs. 51
Although the issue has never been definitively resolved under
the federal Constitution, at least it has been noted. In Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group,152 in dissenting from the Court's

dismissal for lack of a substantial federal question, Justice White
explained:
One of the reasons for the division among the state courts is a
question left unresolved by this Court in Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. In that case, the

Court upheld the provisions of the Price-Anderson Act, which
place a dollar limit on total liability that would be incurred
by a defendant in the event of a nuclear accident. One of the
objections raised against the liability limitation provisions
was that they violated due process by failing to provide those
injured by a nuclear accident with an adequate quid pro quo
for the common-law right of recovery which the Act displaced.
The Court noted: It is not at all clear that the Due Process
Clause in fact requires that a legislatively enacted
compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at
common law or provide a reasonable substitute remedy.
However, we need not resolve this question here."1 53
While the question of remedy stripping by state legislative
action has been hotly debated in state courts interpreting state
constitutional provisions, in the lower federal courts, it seems to be
widely, if not universally, assumed that the right to sue in tort is
not protected by the Due Process Clause,154 or, for that matter, any
151. Id. at 681 n.18. See also Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist
Health Sys., 663 N.W.2d 43, 74 (2000) ("[I]f a common-law right is taken
away, nothing need be given in return."); but see Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1
(Fla. 1993) ("Workmen's compensation abolished the right to sue one's
employer in tort for a job-related injury, but provided adequate, sufficient, and
even preferable safeguards for an employee who is injured on the job, thus
satisfying one of the exceptions to the rule against abolition of the right to
redress for an injury."); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex.
1988) ("As did the Supreme Court of Illinois, we reject any argument that the
statute may be supported by alleged benefits to society generally: Defendants
argue that there is a societal quid pro quo in that loss of recovery potential to
some malpractice victims is offset by 'lower insurance premiums and lower
medical care const for all recipients of medical care.' This quid pro quo does
not extend to the seriously injured medical malpractice victim and does not
serve to bring the limited recovery provision with the rationale of the cases
upholding the constitutionality of the Workman's Compensation Act." (quoting
Wright v Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ill. 1976))).
152. Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 474 U.S. 892 (1985).
153. Id. at 894 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See also
Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1073 (noting the quid pro quo provided to vaccine
manufacturers by the establishment of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act).
154. See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1986).
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other federal Constitutional provision.15 5
In any event, a formal constitutional principle that might
have been available to tort claimants to protect the right to sue
against asserted federal preemption is simply not recognized,
although, there remains some vestige of the idea which is
apparent in the Court's reluctance to rule in a manner that leaves
a injured plaintiff with no remedy at all.156
B. Federalism Concerns
Along the same lines, the federalism claims that plaintiffs'
might have been able to assert to preserve the right to sue under
state common-law principles has also been lost under the
characterization of tort as economic regulation. As Betsy Grey
observed:
If tort law is predominantly based on economics, then
regulating tort law at the federal level aligns closely with the
federal interest in regulating economic activity. The stronger
the economic element in tort law, the stronger the argument
for a substantial, even dominant role for Congress in the tort
system, given its power to regulate national economic
interests.
However, the recognition of an irreducible moral or ethical
imperative in tort law reaches the heart of the exercise of
state sovereign power, giving the states an irreducible role to
play as co-equal norm setters in our federal system. Insofar
as state tort law serves this normative function, it is closer to
the other areas granted special protection, particularly to
criminal law. In that case, Congress's power to federalize tort
law is subject to greater scrutiny under the recent federalism

Any due process challenge must rely on a perceived abrogation of a
common law right to recover for tort damages worked by the statute.
Regarding a due process challenge to a limit on liability in another
context, the United States Supreme Court stated that [o]ur cases have
clearly established that "[a] person has no property, no vested interest,
in any rule of the common law." The "Constitution does not forbid the
creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the
common law, to attain a permissible legislative object," despite the fact
that "otherwise settled expectations" may be upset thereby. Indeed,
statutes limiting liability are relatively commonplace and have
consistently been enforced by the courts.
Id. at 421-22 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S.
59, 88 n.32 (1977)).
155. Although, of course, the cases routinely note federalism concerns. See
e.g., Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1096 n.15 (noting that "[t]his Court ... has long
operated on 'the assumption that the historic police powers of the States are
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."') (citation omitted).
156. See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
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decisions.15 7
Interestingly, prior to the adoption of an instrumentalist view
of tort in the 1960s and 1970s, it was widely held that tort was the
province of state law and preemption was correspondingly rare, a
trend that continued until Cipollone was decided in 1992.158 While
one would think that the rejection of strict liability would be
followed by a return to the earlier view, it certainly has not
happened yet and there are few indications it will in the
foreseeable future. 15 9 The argument here, that tort is generally
understood to be more about personal morality than economic
regulation, leads one away from modern preemption
jurisprudence, yet the fact that preemption functions so effectively
as tort reform makes it attractive to many of the same people who
might otherwise object to federal law displacing that of the
states.160
C. Preemption
1. In General
The final nails in the coffin, so to speak, came in the form of
preemption jurisprudence itself. The first step was the
characterization of tort damages as a form of state regulation. As
noted, 61 in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,162 Justice Stevens
asserted the regulatory equivalence of tort damages and state
legislation and regulation, noting that: "[t]he obligation to pay
compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of
governing conduct and controlling policy."163
In fact, had the court simply said that when legislation
157. Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort
Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475, 534-35 (2002).
158. See OWEN, supra note 4, § 14.4 (explaining that "most courts through
the 1980s and early 1990s followed the Ferebee approach in holding neither
FIFRA nor other federal safety statutes preempted products liability claims.
However, once the Supreme Court in 1992 energized the federal preemption
defense in products liability litigation, the lower courts began to rethink the
role of preemption under federal statutes such as FIFRA.").
159. The Supreme Court's recent punitive damage decision in Philip Morris
USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353-54 (2007), held it was a violation of
defendant's 14th Amendment due process rights to threaten "punishment for
injuring a nonparty victim" contains echoes of corrective justice theory.
160. See Abrams, supra, note 15 (discussing the societal impacts of tort
reform); see also supra note 86 and accompanying text (noting that partisan
opinions play a role in tort reform).
161. See supra text accompanying note 6.
162. Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504.
163. Id. at 521 (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247). See also infra text
accompanying notes 339-44 (arguing that Garmon represented a distinctive
form conflict preemption based on the allocation of decision-making authority,
rather than substantive policy objectives).
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contains both a preemption provision and a savings clause, the
preemption language applies only to state legislation and state
regulatory action, while the savings clause leaves state tort actions
untouched, 164 that interpretation would not only have harmonized
the common statutory language, but very well may have been
what Congress intended, if they can be said to have intended
anything. Furthermore, it would not have been inconsistent with
the federal courts' prior preemption jurisprudence.165
In any event, courts have recognized three theoretically
distinct forms of federal preemption of state law: (1) express
preemption; (2) implied conflict preemption; and (3) implied field
preemption. In 1992, the Court declared that if there was an
express preemption provision, the determination of congressional
intent was governed by the interpretation of that provision. 66 Yet,
by 2000, in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,1 67 the Court
backed off its earlier pronouncement and indicated that, at least
under some circumstances, it would find implied conflict
preemption notwithstanding the existence of an express
preemption clause.168 Additionally, as noted, the Supreme Court
has unequivocally declared that, as a form of state regulation,
state products liability law must fall in the face of congressional
intent-express or implied-to preempt.169
Finally, there is the possibility of a court finding that the
federal legislation was intended to be so comprehensive that it
demonstrated an implied intent by Congress to occupy the field,
leaving no room for state regulation of any kind-including state
164. See supra note 7.
165. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 896 (Stevens, J., dissenting):
It is perfectly clear, however, that the term "safety standard" as used in
these two sections refers to an objective rule prescribed by a legislature
or an administrative agency and does not encompass case-specific
decisions by judges and juries that resolve common-law claims. That
term is used three times in these sections; presumably it is used
consistently. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570, 115 S. Ct.
1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995). The two references to a federal safety
standard are necessarily describing an objective administrative rule. 15
U.S.C. § 1392(a). When the pre-emption provision refers to a safety
standard established by a "State or political subdivision of a State,"
therefore, it is most naturally read to convey a similar meaning. In
addition, when the two sections are read together, they provide
compelling evidence of an intent to distinguish between legislative and
administrative rulemaking, on the one hand, and common-law liability,
on the other. This distinction was certainly a rational one for Congress
to draw in the Safety Act given that common-law liability-unlike most
legislative or administrative rulemaking-necessarily performs an
important remedial role in compensating accident victims.
166. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
167. Geier, 529 U.S. 861.
168. Id. at 869.
169. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521.
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tort law.170
2. Implied Conflict Preemption

Courts have recognized two different types of implied conflict
preemption, although in Geier the majority asserted the
distinction between them was one of terminology rather than
substance.171 The first, "impossibility conflict," is said to exist
when a party is subjected to two or more sets of regulation and
cannot comply with both. The second is said to exist when the
application of conflicting state law would "prevent or frustrate the
accomplishment of a federal objective."172
a. Impossibility Conflict
To say that it is impossible for a defendant to comply with two
sets of regulation has taken on a special meaning in preemption
analysis-one that is of fairly recent origin. As long as a strict
liability instrumentalist view of tort law predominated, the fact
that liability might be imposed for conduct that complied with a
regulatory command was not viewed as rendering compliance
"impossible." Thus, in Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,173 the
court dismissed the argument noting that "Chevron can comply
with both federal and state law by continuing to use the EPAapproved label and by simultaneously paying damages to
successful tort plaintiffs."174 Only after the fall of instrumentalist
strict liability and its replacement with a negligence standard, was
a conflict seen, although, as I argued elsewhere, this conclusion
should have been based on a perception of unfairness to the
defendant, rather than as a matter of congressional intent. 75
Thus, for example, in Cipollone, decided as an express
preemption case, Congress had mandated that cigarette packaging
and advertising were to bear a specified warning. To have
permitted defendants to be held liable based on the inadequacy of
this warning, notwithstanding their complete lack of choice
regarding the warning's content, would be regarded as simply
of
understanding
current
unfair, falling within the
170. See infra notes 184-93 and accompanying text (using case law to
illustrate the federal government's dominant presence in tort law).
171. Geier, 529 U.S. at 873.
172. Id.
173. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
174. Id. at 1541. See also Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability
Preemption: An InstitutionalApproach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 459-71
(2008) (noting that the Court continues to struggle with the question of
whether tort should be viewed as compensatory or regulatory and pointing out
inconsistencies in recent preemption decisions).

175. Martin A. Kotler, Shared Sovereign Immunity as a Alternative to
Federal Preemption:An Essay on the Attribution of Responsibility for Harm to
Others, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 157, 181 (2008).
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"impossibility."176
b.

Frustration of Federal Objective
On the other hand, the "frustration" of federal policy cases,
epitomized by Geier, are trickier.17 7 In that case, the Department
of Transportation (DOT) regulation scheme gave automobile
manufacturers a choice of different passive restraint systems to
incorporate into the design of their products. As the majority
explained:
[The safety standard (FMVSS 208)] deliberately sought
variety-a mix of several different passive restraint systems.
It did so by setting a performance requirement for passive
restraint devices and allowing manufacturers to choose
among different passive restraint mechanisms, such as
airbags, automatic belts, or other passive restraint
technologies to satisfy that requirement. And DOT explained
why FVSS 208 sought the mix of devices that it expected its
performance standard to produce. DOT wrote that it had
rejected a proposed FMVSS 208 "all airbag" standard because
of safety concerns (perceived or real) associated with airbags,
which concerns threatened a "backlash" more easily overcome
"if airbags" were "not the only way of complying." It added
that a mix of devices would help develop data on comparative
effectiveness, would allow the industry time to overcome the
safety problems and the high production costs associated
with airbags, and would facilitate the development of
alternative, cheaper, and safer passive restraint systems.178
When Honda was sued, the plaintiffs theory was that the
defendant declined to elect airbags from among the choices and
that decision made the vehicle defective by reason of its design.1 79
Impossibility conflict did not exist given that the regulation did
not prohibit the use of airbags. On the other hand, frustration of
federal purpose was plausible, depending on how one defined the
underlying federal policy objective. If, as the majority stated, the
policy was the granting of design choice to automobile

176. See also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567-70 (2009) (declining to find
conflict preemption under the FDA largely on the basis that FDA approval of
warnings did not strip the defendant of the option of strengthening the
warning).
177. Just how tricky the issue has become is exemplified by the Court's
recent decision in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131
(2011) (finding no preemption on facts virtually identical to those in Geier).
See also id. at 1143 (Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting "[tihe dispositive
difference between this case and Geier-indeed the only difference-is the
majority's 'psychoanalysis' of the regulators.").
178. Geier, 529 U.S. at 878-79 (internal citations omitted).
179. Id. at 865.
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manufacturers,180 there appears to be a conflict. If, on the other
hand, the somewhat larger federal policy objective was to promote
safety, there was no conflict between that objective and having
state products liability law serve to impose liability if automobile
manufacturers unreasonably chose the more dangerous design. As
the dissent argued, it is entirely possible that the imposition of
tort liability would further the safety purpose of the regulation.18 '
Either expressly relying on the Geier majority's analysis or, at
least utilizing the same approach, a series of decisions have
emerged from both state and federal courts finding implied
preemption by rules promulgated by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA),18 2 and the Consumer Products
Safety Commission (CPSC),1sa to name just two that the Supreme
Court is yet to confront.
Field Preemption Distinguished
As noted, field preemption may be implied "if federal law so
thoroughly occupies a legislative field 'as to make reasonable the
c.

180. Id. at 875.
181. Id. at 903-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting):
The phase-in program authorized by Standard 208 thus set minimum
percentage requirements for the installation of passive restraints,
increasing in annual stages of 10, 25, 40, and 100%. Those
requirements were not ceilings, and it is obvious that the Secretary
favored a more rapid increase. The possibility that exposure to potential
tort liability might accelerate the rate of increase would actually
further the only goal explicitly mentioned in the standard itself:
reducing the number of deaths and severity of injuries of vehicle
occupants. Had gradualism been independently important as a method
of achieving the Secretary's safety goals, presumably the Secretary
would have put a ceiling as well as a floor on each annual increase in
the required percentage of new passive restraint installations.
See also Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1097 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing
that tort liability will serve to "ensure that licensed vaccines keep pace with
technological and scientific advances.").
182. Gonzalez v. Ideal Tile Importing Co., Inc., 877 A.2d 1247, 1252-53 (N.J.
2005); Arnoldy v. Forklift L.P., 927 A.2d 257, 264-68 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007),
overruled by Kiak v. Crown Equip. Corp., 989 A.2d 385, 394-95 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2010).
183. Moe v. MTD, 73 F.3d 179, 183 (8th Cir. 1996); Cortez v. MTD Prod.,
Inc., 927 F. Supp. 386, 391 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Ball v. Bic Corp., 2000 WL
33312192, at *2 (D. Mo. 2000); Frazier v. Heckingers, 96 F. Supp. 2d 486, 488
(E.D. Pa. 2000); Frith v. Bic Corp., 863 So.2d 960, 967 (Miss. 2004); Bic Pen
Corp. v. Carter, 251 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. 2008); but see Colon ex rel. Molina
v. BIC USA, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 196, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that
allowing plaintiffs state claims is consistent with the purposes of the
Consumer Product Safety Act); Cummins v. BIC USA, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d
737, 743 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (stating that plaintiffs state law claims will not
upset federal regulatory scheme); Hittle v. Scripto-Tokai, 166 F. Supp. 2d 142,
149 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (finding that claims was not preempted by the Consumer
Product Safety Act).
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inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it."'184 In cases of regulatory agencies, field preemption may be
found even if an agency has not actually exercised the regulatory
authority granted by Congress as long as Congress has delegated
the power to occupy the field. 185
Field preemption, though relatively rare in theory, was found
in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.,186 under the federal
Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act. Act of Feb. 17, 1911 (as
amended). The case considered the validity of locomotive safety
statutes enacted by Georgia and Wisconsin. It was acknowledged
that the state laws did not conflict with the federal legislation, but
required safety appliances in addition to those either required
under federal law or which could have been required under federal
law had the Interstate Commerce Commission chosen to
regulate.187 Moreover, it was acknowledged that, absent
preemption, the state legislation was enacted as a legitimate
exercise of state police power. 8 8 Nevertheless, as Justice Brandeis
explained:
The federal and the state statutes are directed to the same
subject-the equipment of locomotives. They operate upon
the same object. It is suggested that the power delegated to
the Commission has been exerted only in respect to minor
changes or additions. But this, if true, is not of legal
significance. It is also urged that, even if the Commission has
power to prescribe an automatic firebox door and a cab
curtain, it has not done so, and that it has made no other
requirement inconsistent with the state legislation. This,
also, if true, is without legal significance. The fact that the
Commission has not seen fit to exercise its authority to the
full extent conferred, has no bearing upon the construction of
the act delegating the power. We hold that state legislation is
precluded, because the Boiler Inspection Act, as we construe
it, was intended to occupy the field. The broad scope of the
authority conferred upon the Commission leads to that
conclusion. Because the standard set by the Commission
must prevail, requirements by the states are precluded,
however commendable or however different their purpose.18 9
Field preemption under the Boiler Inspection Act (and its
successor, the Federal Locomotive Inspection Act)190 has been
184. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).

185. Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 613 (1926).
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id. at 610-11.
Id. at 610.
Id. at 612-13.
49 U.S.C.A. §§ 20701-20903 (2010).
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extended to preclude personal injury claims and further extended
to encompass tort claims against locomotive manufacturers, even
191
though the statute by its terms applies to locomotive operators.
While many of the field preemption decisions have dealt with
this same body of railroad safety legislation, they have been
employed to a lesser extent in other types of cases. Thus, for
example, in Campbell v. Hussey,192 a federal law dealing with the
grading of tobacco was found to preempt a Georgia statute
regulating the same subject, notwithstanding the absence of any
conflict between state and federal law. Little explanation for
finding the requisite intent to occupy the field was provided in that
case, a fact which drew a sharply critical dissent from the late
Justice Black who objected that "the Court proceeds from the bare
fact of congressional legislation to the conclusion of federal preemption by application of a mechanistic formula which operates
independently of congressional intent."119 3
Importantly, it should also be noted that, depending on how a
court articulates federal policy, conflict preemption and field
preemption can be effectively conflated. For example, if a court
were to find a federal policy of "uniformity," almost by definition
the results of state common-law litigation potentially would
conflict with federal policy.194 Thus, one ends up with de facto field
preemption. If, on the other hand, a court is more precise in
articulating a substantive policy-e.g., manufacturer choice in the
selection of passive restraint systems-then implied conflict is
readily distinguishable from field preemption.
There is another important distinction that arises because of
the Court's insistence that preemption is rooted in congressional
intent. Statutes frequently are written so as to contain both
express preemption language and a savings clause. For example,
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA), at
issue in Geier, provided:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard
established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or
political subdivision of a State shall have any authority
either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to
any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment[,] any
safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance
of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to
195
the Federal standard.
The Act also provided that compliance with federal safety
191. Law v. Gen. Motors Corp., 114 F.3d 908, 910 (9th Cir. 1997); Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Kilgore, 853 So.2d 171, 175-76 (Ala. 2002).
192. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
193. Id. at 311-12.
194. See infra text accompanying notes 313-14.
195. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (repealed 1994) (quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 861).
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standards "does not exempt any person from any liability under
common law." 96
In the course of finding implied conflict preemption, the Court
observed that the savings clause's mere presence squarely
contradicted a claim of congressional intent to occupy the field
since, in Justice Breyer's words, a "savings clause assumes that
there are some significant number of common-law liability cases to
save"' 97 and further "reflects a congressional determination that
occasional nonuniformity is a small price to pay for a system in
which juries not only create, but also enforce, safety standards,
while simultaneously providing necessary compensation to
victims. That policy by itself disfavors pre-emption, at least some
of the time." 198 In short, the mere existence of the savings clause
seems to irrefutably deny the possibility that Congress intended to
occupy the field and force courts to narrowly articulate the federal
policy at stake to determine whether common-law litigation would
actually conflict.
IV.

THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION REGULATION
OF DISPOSABLE LIGHTERS

A. Background

The Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA)19 9 was enacted in
1972. It established and delegated the power to make rules and set
consumer product standards to the Consumer Products Safety
Commission (CPSC). 2 00 Like many federal laws, the CPSA
contains a preemption provision as well as a savings clause. The
preemption provision provides:
Whenever a consumer product safety standard under this
chapter is in effect and applies to a risk of injury associated
with a consumer product, no State or political subdivision of a
State shall have any authority either to establish or to
continue in effect any provision of a safety standard or
regulation which prescribes any requirements as to the
performance,
composition,
contents,
design, finish,
construction, packaging, or labeling of such product which
are designed to deal with the same risk of injury associated
with such consumer product, unless such requirements are
identical to the requirements of the Federal standard. 201
There is also somewhat of an exception to the foregoing.
Subsection (c) provides:
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (repealed 1994) (quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 861).
Geier, 529 U.S. at 868.
Id. at 871.
15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-83 (1972).
15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (1972).
15 U.S.C. § 2075(a) (1972).
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Upon application of a State or political subdivision of a State,
the Commission may by rule, after notice and opportunity for
oral presentation of views, exempt from the provisions of
subsection (a) of this section (under such conditions as it may
impose in the rule) any proposed safety standard or
regulation which is described in such application and which
is designed to protect against a risk of injury associated with
a consumer product subject to a consumer product safety
standard under this chapter if the State or political
subdivision standard or regulation(1) provides a significantly higher degree of protection from
such risk of injury than the consumer product safety
standard under this chapter, and
(2) does not unduly burden interstate commerce. 202
The savings clause provides, "[c]ompliance with the consumer
product safety rules or other rules or orders under this chapter
shall not relieve any person from liability at common law or under
State statutory law to any other person."203
In 1993, the CPSC addressed .the perceived need for a
mandatory standard governing child-resistant features for
disposable lighters. 204 It was asserted that the rule ultimately
promulgated by the Commission, was "designed to reduce the risk
of death and injury from accidental fires started by children
playing with lighters."205 The agency found that:
From 1988 to 1990, an estimated 160 deaths per year
resulted from such fires. About 150 of these deaths, plus
nearly 1,100 injuries and nearly $70 million in property
damage, resulted from fires started by children under the age
of 5. The annual cost of such fires to the public is estimated
at about $385 million (in 1990 dollars). 206
To address the problem, the agency mandated that
manufacturers provide the Commission with a description of the
child-resistant design features as a condition for the issuance of a
certificate of compliance. 207 The rule further specified the testing
protocols for the lighters, 208 using children of specified ageS209 and

202. 15 U.S.C. § 2075(c) (1972).
203. 15 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1972).
204. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, Safety Standard for Cigarette
Lighters, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,557-01 (codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 1210.1-1210.5,
1210.11-1210.18, 1210.20 (1993)).
205. 16 C.F.R. § 1210.5(a) (1993).
206. Id.
207. 16 C.F.R. § 1210.15(b)(1)-(3) (1993) (description of design feature); 16
C.F.R. § 1210.12(b)(1) (1993) (certificate of compliance).
208. 16 C.F.R. § 1210.4 (2003).
209. 16 C.F.R. § 1210.4(a)(4) (1993) (ranging from about forty-two months to
fifty-one months).
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mock ("surrogate") lighters that contained the safety features to be
tested, but which emitted an audible or visual signal, rather than
a flame. 210 Importantly, the rule specifically required that,
following the testing protocols, at least eighty-five percent of the
test subjects be unable to successfully operate the surrogate
lighter. 21 1
Quite obviously, the cost-benefit analysis performed by the
CPSC raises a few questions, not the least of which include the
means by which the agency monetized the cost of 150 deaths and
1100 burn injuries in coming up with the figure of $385 million per
year (in 1990 dollars). 212 However, as important an issue as this
may be, it is less troubling than the eighty-five percent standard.
One might well ask why the standard was not set at ninety
percent or even one hundred percent. After all, if the lighters were
designed so that none of the test subjects could operate them, the
entire annual cost generated by less-than-five-year-old children
playing with lighters (whatever that number might be) could be
eliminated.
While many cost-benefit analyses have been criticized by
researchers for their outright failure to address key factors, e.g.,
not providing quantitative information on net benefits, 2 13 and/or
the overall quality of the analysis, 214 the CPSC rule under
210. 16 C.F.R. § 1210.2(f (1993) (definition of surrogate lighter); 16 C.F.R.
§ 1210.4(c) (1993) (protocol for using surrogate lighters).
211. 16 C.F.R. § 1210.3(a) (1993) ("A lighter subject to this part 1210 shall be
resistant to successful operation by at least 85 percent of the child-test panel
when tested in the manner prescribed by § 1210.4.4.").
212. See supra text accompanying note 206. The number seems a little odd.
If the 150 lives were valued at $2 million each, and property damages were
estimated at $70 million, that means the balance of the estimate of $15 million
covers 1100 burn injuries, which seems awfully low given how physically and
psychically devastating burn injuries can be (even in 1990 dollars).
Assuming full compliance with the rule and no substantial change
in the relative market shares of the various available types of
lighters, between 80 and 105 deaths per year may be averted by the
issuance of the rule. The total annual value of reductions in deaths
(valued for statistical comparison purposes at $2 million each),
injuries, and property damage is approximately $205-270 million . .
[T]he rule may cost consumers approximately $90 million per year.
Thus, annual net benefits of $115-180 may accrue.
58 Fed. Reg. 37,557-01, 37,564.
213. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Patrick Dudley, How Well Does the
Government Do Cost-Benefit Analysis? 23-25 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for
Regulatory
Studies, Working Paper 04-01, 2004),
available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=495462 (examining the usefulness of government cost
benefit analysis).
214. Id. See also Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L.
REV. 7, 12 (1998) (warning of the danger that cost-benefit analysis will be
"cynically used by powerful interest groups to undermine the regulatory wall
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discussion here specifically addressed the choice of the eighty-five
percent standard and specifically chose to reject adoption of a more
stringent standard 215 of ninety, ninety-five, or even one hundred
percent. To understand the stated reasons for rejecting the more
stringent standards, some background information on the
cigarette lighter industry, and the events leading up to the
promulgation of the eighty-five percent rule, may be helpful.
According to the CPSC, in 1991, "[c]onsumers purchased more
than 600 million lighters in the United States."2 16 Although there
were about fifty importers of lighters doing business in the
country, 217 in 1989 three companies commanded a ninety-five
percent share of the market for disposable lighters.218 These were:
Bic Corp., Wilkinson Sword (Cricket/Feudor), and Scripto/Tokai. 219
By 1991, however, the market share for the big three had declined
to seventy percent because of the increasing competition from
importers of cheap lighters from Korea, China, Thailand, and the
Philippines. 220 According to the CPSC, "[s]ince the late 1980's,
there has been a steady market penetration of very low-priced ...
disposable butane roll and press lighters." 221
Before 1993, when the mandatory rule was promulgated,
there was a "draft voluntary safety standard for the child
resistance of lighters developed by the ASTM F15.02 Task Group
on Safety Standards for Lighters" which the Commission
characterized as "similar in most respects to the final CPSC
mandatory rule." 222 Although the draft had not been formally
adopted, in 1992 both Cricket and Bic were offering conforming
products for sale and the Commission "assumed that the Cricket
and Bic products w[ould] meet the CPSC [mandatory] rule as
well." 223
In other words, it would appear that the major players in the
industry either had already met the eighty-five percent standard
or were confident that they could do so within the one-year period
of time specified for compliance. 224 Thus, they were apparently

that Congress has erected to protect human health and the environment.").
215. 16 C.F.R. § 1210.5(g)(4) (1993).
216. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,557-01, 37,563.
217. Id. at 37,564.
218. Id.
219. Id. Bic was apparently the only seller of disposable lighters that had a
production facility in the United States. Id. Zippo, described as "the only
domestic firm that does not import any of its lighters," was a manufacturer of
"luxury lighters" and, therefore, "markets no products known to be subject to
the rule." Id. at 37,568, 37,573.
220. Id. at 37,564.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 37,572.
223. Id.
224. Id. See also id. at 37,562 (stating that "[tlhe rules shall become effective
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supporting the establishment of the mandatory standard, if for no
other reason than because its adoption would improve their
competitive position. In fact, the Commission report specifically
notes that:
The several largest firms marketing disposable lighters may
gain some temporary competitive advantage in the U.S.
market. Their firms were involved more heavily in the
development of the ASTM draft voluntary standard; they
were also generally more aware of the details of CPSC's
regulatory proceeding, though either ASTM or the Lighter
Association. Some of these major firms expended resources to
develop and test child-resistant lighter designs; two
companies (Bic and Cricket) began marketing disposable
lighters with child-resistant features around the time of the
Commission's proposal, and others are expected to have done
so by the time this final rule is issued. 225
The CPSC report duly notes that "[t]he Regulatory Flexibility
Act (RFA),226 requires that rules be reviewed for their potential
economic impact on small entities, including small businesses."227
After consideration, the Commission concluded that the rule "may
have significant, short-term economic effects on [30-35] small
businesses," 228 since "[tihe foreign suppliers of some small
importers may lack the technical capability to develop complying
child-resistant lighters. These importers may leave the U.S.
market temporarily, or experience disruption in the supply of
complying lighters; either outcome could adversely affect the
competitive position of small companies [with a corresponding
competitive advantage for larger firms]."229 Nevertheless, these
adverse effects would be ameliorated by "establishing a reasonable
acceptance criterion [eighty-five percent] attainable by most small
firms; and extending the effective date to give affected firmsespecially small importers-more time to develop and obtain
July 12, 1994. Lighters subject to the standard and manufactured in, or
imported into, the United States on or after the effective date must comply.
The 12-month period was selected in order to get child-resistant lighters into
consumers' hands as quickly as reasonably possible, while allowing sufficient
time for manufactures and importers of most lighters to design, produce and
import safer products. The 12-month period should also minimize any
potential disruption that may occur among small importers of lighters subject
to the standard.").
225. Id. at 37,565.
226. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (1908).
227. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,557-01, 37,573 (internal footnote omitted).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 37,573-74. The report specifically notes that, "[1]arger firms with
greater resources to invest in the development of child-resistant lighters may
gain some competitive advantage once the rule is effective; two firms already
market disposable lighters that are believed to comply with the performance
requirements of the rule." Id. at 37,575.
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complying products."230 Further concessions to the small
companies, i.e., other "potentially burden-reducing alternatives"
including 'lowering the acceptance criterion for acceptable
performance, [andlor] further extending the effective date," the
Commission concluded, were not worth the safety trade off.231
In short, then, the eighty-five percent standard implemented
by the rule was not chosen to maximize safety, but rather because
the large players in the industry could already meet it, and its
adverse economic impact on the small players was not judged to be
excessive. Although at least two of those who commented on the
proposed rule urged the adoption of a more stringent standard, 232
the Commission specifically rejected such proposals, apparently on
the basis of either information provided by the major players or
sheer speculation regarding the consequences. 233 The final rule
adopted by the Commission explained that:
A higher (90 percent) acceptance criterion was also
considered. This higher performance level is not
commercially or technically feasible for many firms, however;
the Commission believes that this more stringent alternative
would have substantial adverse effects on manufacturing and
competition, and would increase costs disproportionate to
benefits. The Commission believes that the requirement that
complying lighters not be operable by at least 85 percent of
children in prescribed tests strikes a reasonable balance
between improved safety for a substantial majority of young
children and other potential fire victims and the potential for
adverse competitive effects and manufacturing disruption. 234
As to the claim that technological feasibility could not be
shown, it is contradicted in the same report. In response to a
comment urging the adoption of a "two motion" feature, the report
notes that a "lighter design that does not require a two-direction
action exceeded the proposed 85 percent acceptance criterion." 235
Thus, the issue appears to have been one of economic feasibility,
particularly for small companies, rather than technical
engineering problems.
The claim regarding economic feasibility is also questionable.
While the report asserts that instituting an eighty-five percent
criterion is likely to result in an "increase in total per-unit
manufacturing cost . . . estimated at 1-5 cents for disposables . . .
."236 No estimates of cost or price per lighter under a stricter

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 37,575.
Id.
Id. at 37,578.
Id.
16 C.F.R. § 1210.5(g)(4) (1993).
58 Fed. Reg. at 37,557, 37,580.
Id. at 37,565.
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standard were provided.
The report goes on to speculate that if the safety standard
were increased above the eighty-five percent criterion to ninety or
ninety-five percent ("[n]early-child-proof'), "[1]ighters would
probably be so difficult to operate that many adults could not
operate them." The imposition of such a standard "could virtually
ban disposable lighters." 237 However, since no specific design was
mandated by the rule, it is impossible to assess whether or to what
extent ease of use would be affected.
The report further speculates that "consumers may find the
child-resistant features of some complying lighters unacceptably
inconvenient and switch to matches instead,"238 which are less safe
than lighters with some child-resistant features. Again, however,
it seems impossible to evaluate the likelihood of such behavior. 239
In fact, it seems equally likely, if not more so, that consumers
unhappy with child-resistant lighters would switch to inexpensive
reusable "luxury" lighters, 240 which the Commission deliberately
chose to leave unregulated, primarily, it would seem, to protect
Zippo, the only American lighter manufacturer. 241
B. The Role of Economic Considerationsin the Decision of
Negligence Cases
1. Exclusion of Broad Economic Policy
It is generally, though certainly not universally, 242 agreed
that it is not proper to weigh broad economic policy considerations
as part of a balancing test to determine the basis for tort liability.
In fact, macro-economic effects are not considered to be
appropriately taken into consideration even when they directly
concern the defendant. For example, comment f to Section 2 of the
Products Liability Restatement specifically observes that: "[I]t is
not a factor under Subsection (b) that the imposition of liability
would have a negative effect on corporate earnings or would
reduce employment in a given industry."243
Of course, all industrial activities from the production of raw
materials through the manufacture and sale of component parts
and the marketing of the final product are beneficial to society as a
237. Id. at 37,570.
238. Id. at 37,564.

239. Id. (noting that "the extent of the influence of these factors is
uncertain.").
240. See id. at 37,564 (describing "luxury lighters" as those generally
retailing for above ten dollars).
241. See supra note 219.
242. See, e.g., Gomez, 146 S.W.3d at 182 (asserting that "[t]he considerations
[in deciding whether to impose a common-law duty] include social, economic,
and political questions and their application to the facts at hand.").
243. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2, cmt. f (1998).
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whole. As I pointed out elsewhere:
Leaving aside . . . the difficulty, or even the appropriateness,

of attempting to determine whether a particular type of
product has "utility" to the consumer or whether some
products have greater utility than others, and who should
make these decisions, the claim that the social benefits of
making products at all should be factored into the analysis is
worth looking at briefly. Raw materials need to be mined,
grown, or otherwise obtained and processed; people have to
be hired to test, design, manufacture, assemble and market
component parts and ultimately the finished product. All of
these, and a host of other related activities, generate jobs and
provide general economic benefits to society as a whole.
Moreover, given that we live in an increasingly global society,
the export (or import) of products affects the balance of trade
and has an impact on worldwide economics and, for that
matter, politics. 244
Nevertheless, for purposes of determining liability, that type
of benefit does not count. Thus, for example, in Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.,2 45 the defendant manufacturer attempted to justify
the marketing of cigarettes under a risk-utility test by offering
evidence of the high social benefit of engaging in the process of
manufacturing and marketing cigarettes, the court excluded such
evidence observing:
[A]1though the risklutility analysis mandated by the New
Jersey Supreme Court may be far-reaching, its focus remains
solely on the usefulness of, and dangers inherent in, the
product. For while it is true that the "reasonableness" of the
manufacturer will in the end be relevant to a determination
of whether the product should have been placed on the
market, such "reasonableness" is determined by looking only
to the social benefits of a product, as opposed to its
production. Notwithstanding defendants' attempts to extract
such a meaning by means of selective citation, the New
Jersey Supreme Court's decisions have never said that a
product's utility may be established by looking to whether the
defendant "reasonably" believed that its profits would be
sufficient to maintain a livelihood, hire employees, or pay
taxes by operating the company that placed a product on the
market. 246
While the foregoing excerpt also serves to illustrate some of
the early confusion inherent in the attempts to combine a
negligence (reasonableness) approach to a strict liability regime,

244. MARTIN A. KOTLER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND BASIC TORT LAW 153
(2005).
245. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 283 (D.N.J. 1986).
246. Id. at 288.
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the basic point goes to the limits necessarily imposed on balancing
in a products liability context. Given that in a negligence case the
focus must necessarily be on the defendant's status as wrongdoer
and the plaintiff-defendant relationship, i.e., whether the
defendant is a wrongdoer as to the victim, consideration of the
conduct of non-parties, and consideration of broad economic factors
are simply outside of the sphere of civil litigation. 247
2. Cost to the Defendant

This is not to say, however, that the monetary cost to a party
of engaging or declining to engage in an activity is not to be
considered. Although some of the early law and economics
literature undoubtedly overstated the moral implications of
monetary cost, 248 long before the Terry-Hand "Calculus of the
Risk" explicitly identified the defendant's cost of accident
avoidance as a consideration, it was implicit in the understanding
of reasonableness. 249
The consideration of cost to a party as a factor in determining
negligence, coupled with the exclusion of evidence of economic
benefit to society as a whole, is entirely consistent with the widely
held general understanding of personal responsibility and the
relational nature of negligence claims. To permit one individual to
harm another based on the actor's individual conception of the
social good would represent an expression of fundamental
inequality between the doer of harm and the sufferer of harm in
that one party unilaterally takes it upon him or herself to decide
what is in the public interest at another's expense. 250 In that

247. Regarding excuses to otherwise tortious misconduct based on violation
of statute or regulation, see infra text accompanying notes 130-34.
248. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal
Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUDIES 103, 134 (1979) (discussing the right to sell
oneself into slavery and other cases where the wealth maximization principles
"are at odds with common moral intuition."); see also Martin A. Kotler,
Motivation and Tort Law: Acting for Economic Gain as a Suspect Motive, 41
VAND. L. REV. 63, 101-07 (1988) (pointing out some limitations of the
economists positions in light of the commonly found suspicion of the profit
motive).
249. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 123 (2d ed. 1972)
(explaining that "[a]lthough the Hand formula is of relatively recent origin,
the method that it capsulizes has been the basic one used to determine
negligence ever since negligence was first adopted as the standard to govern
accident cases."). See also Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 29 (1972) (expanding on the thesis).
250. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-4 (1971) (asserting that "each
person possesses an inviolability that even the welfare of society as a whole
cannot override."); see also Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in
Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 143, 164-65 (2002) (explaining Kant's
categorical imperative, Wright states: "It is morally wrong under the
categorical imperative to fail to respect the absolute moral worth of anyone,
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sense, it is similar to the privilege to enter another's land or injure
their chattels based on public necessity. Though, at one time, one
who harmed another based on his or her reasonable perception of
the public good was not required to compensate for the trespass to
land or injury to chattels. 251 Few if any commentators found merit
in the rule,252 however, and a few recent cases have either
squarely rejected it,253 or applied it narrowly. 25 4
If, on the other hand, one is not taking it upon him or herself
to decide what is in the public interest, but can point to the
expression of a legislative or regulatory body that has, at least
arguably, sanctioned the harm-causing conduct at issue, should
this serve to evidence the existence of a collective goal (as opposed
to an individual determination of what conduct serves the general
good) and provide a basis for justifying one's harm-causing
conduct?

including yourself, as a self-legislating rational being, regardless of whether
you would allow others to treat you without proper respect. All persons should
be treated as ends in themselves (i.e., as free and equal persons seeking to
fully realize their humanity), rather than as mere means to be used to benefit
others or society as a whole.").
251. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OR TORTS §§ 191, 262 (1965).
252. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 24, at 147 (5th ed. 1984) (arguing that "if the property so
appropriated was not a part of the menace and was not itself likely to be
harmed to destroyed anyway, the owner should be compensated."). See also
Derek T. Muller, "As Much Upon Tradition as Upon Principle":A Critique of
the Privilege of Necessity Destruction under the Fifth Amendment, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 481, 523 (2006) (concluding that "[a]ttempted policy
justifications of the privilege overwhelmingly reject concern for the injured
property owner. As a matter of policy, this rejection is fundamentally contrary
to the values of the early common law philosophers and the nation's
Founders.").
253. See, e.g., Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn.
1991) (holding municipality obligated to compensate homeowner and
subrogated insurer); Wallace v. City of Atlantic City, 608 A.2d 480, 483 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that damage caused for the public benefit requires
compensation by the public); Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 789
(Tex. 1980) (holding that the principle of "fairness and justice" requires
compensation for destroyed property).
254. See, e.g., Protectus Alpha Nay. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, 585 F. Supp.
1062, 1067 (1984), affd 767 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding danger not
sufficiently imminent to justify destructive conduct). Barton-Barnes, Inc. v.
State, 583 N.Y.S.2d 547, 548 (App. Div. 1992) (finding insufficient reasonable
effort to eradicate toxins before resorting to complete destruction of the car);
Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 501 A.2d 226, 229 (Pa.), remanded to 535 A.2d 91
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), app. denied, 557 A.2d 341 (Pa.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
883 (1989) (public disaster would not result from type of dangerous activity).
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C. The Regulatory/Statutory Compliance Defense
1. In General
In recent years, the weight to be given to proof of the
defendant's compliance with a relevant statute of administrative
regulation has been hotly debated. 255 A number of state
legislatures even enacted laws creating a presumption of nondefectiveness in cases where there had been regulatory
compliance, 256 although, since the plaintiff normally has the
burden of proving that the product is defective, it is not at all clear
what such a presumption adds. 257 In any case, the judicial creation
of a regulatory compliance defense for product producers has
assumed a few distinct forms. The weakest version of the defense,
adopted by the Products Liability Restatement, asserts that
evidence of compliance with safety regulations is admissible in
design and warning cases to show non-defectiveness. 258 A
somewhat stronger version of this defense, or at least one which is
more precise, was articulated by Hans Linde, who called for
judicial deference to administrative decision making in some cases
of alleged design defect-depending on the extent to which the
administrative agency had considered the same risk-utility factors
that a jury is to base its determination of product defectiveness. 25 9
An even stronger version of the regulatory compliance defense
was announced by the court in Grundbergv. Upjohn Co.,2 60 a Utah
Supreme Court decision extending to defendants "a broad grant of
immunity from strict liability claims based on design defects . . .

255. See generally Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort
Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 461 (1997);
Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong"Regulatory Compliance Defense,
55 MD. L. REV. 1210 (1996); Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, supra note
15 (demonstrating different views of compliance regarding administrative
regulations).
256. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(1) (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a)
(2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.2946(4) (West 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (West 2010);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.008(a) (Vernon 2009); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-6-703(2) (2008).
257. In other words, how does one "shift" the burden of proof to one who
already bears that burden?
258. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 4(b) (noting "a
product's compliance with an applicable product safety statute or
administrative regulation is properly considered in determining whether the
product is defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the
statute or regulation, but such compliance does not preclude as a matter of law
a finding of product defect.").
259. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1334-35 (Or. 1978). See
also infra note 277 and accompanying text.
260. Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991).
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[inherent in] FDA-approved prescription drugs in Utah."261
There are problems, however, with adoption of even the
weakest version of the statutory compliance defense. Under a
negligence approach, the application of the same reasonableness
standard-viewed as a community judgment of moral fault-could
and should potentially result in different outcomes for different
defendants even though they produced identical or comparable
products. Although under a weak version of a regulatory
compliance defense, such as that adopted by the Third
Restatement of Torts, evidence that one has complied with an
industry standard is admissible on the question of a defendant's
wrongdoing, it is not dispositive. 262
While negligence law normally imposes some minimum
standard of behavior to which all actors are held regardless of
whether any one individual is capable of meeting it,263 those with
greater talents, abilities, or resources can be found negligent for
their failure to exercise that greater potential. 264 This idea is
incorporated in the concept of a "feasible alternative design" as
that requirement has been developed into a somewhat specialized
rule to be applied in product design cases. 265
261. Id. at 99.
262. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2, cmt. d (1998):
The defendant is . . . allowed to introduce evidence with regard to

industry practice that bears on whether an alternative design was
practicable. Industry practice may also be relevant to whether the
omission of an alternative design rendered the product not reasonably
safe. While such evidence is admissible, it is not necessarily dispositive.
If the plaintiff introduces expert testimony to establish that a
reasonable alternative design could practically have been adopted, a
trier of fact may conclude that the product was defective
notwithstanding that such a design was not adopted by any
manufacturer, or even considered for commercial use, at the time of
sale.
263. See Vaughn v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837)
(rejecting an individual best efforts approach and adopted an objective
external standard of behavior).
264. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299, cmt. f (1965):
If the actor possesses special competence, he must exercise it, not only
in his profession, trade, or occupation, but also whenever a reasonable
man in his position would realize that its exercise is necessary to the
reasonable safety of others. The superior competence, as the result of
aptitude developed by special training and experience, may even give to
the actor special ability to perceive the existing facts, or special
knowledge of other pertinent matters which, separately or together,
may enable him to realize the necessity of using his highly competent
technique which a person of lesser competence would not realize.
265. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2 (1998)
uses the language of "reasonable alternative design." Interestingly, at the 71st
ALI Annual Meeting of 1994, Professor Owen objected to that phrase pointing
out that the case law being restated universally referred to "feasible
alternative" and unsuccessfully moved to amend. 71 ALI Proc. 187-88 (May 18,
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Consider, for example, the case of Appel v. Standex
International Corp.266 There, the plaintiff was a nurse who was
injured while attempting to make up a hospital bed. 267 The bed,
manufactured by the defendant, was on wheels.26 8 The plaintiff
sought to introduce evidence of an alternative wheel brake design
that would have prevented the accident. 269 Finding the case
analogous to Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,270 decided five years
earlier, the court rejected the argument, observing:
In Wilson, as in this case, the defendant did not manufacture
the allegedly defective component part, but rather
incorporated it in the assembly of another product. It is
implicit in Wilson that in this type of case the plaintiff must
adduce evidence that the alternative safer design was
commercially available at the time the offending product was
manufactured. Use of the alternative design cannot be said to
be "practicable" if the defendant is not in the business of
manufacturing the component part, and if a part
incorporating the allegedly safer design is not available for
purchase. As the court said in Wilson, a "plaintiffs prima
facie case of a defect must show more than the technical
possibility of a safer design."27 1
In other words, the issue is not that manufacturers who
design all component parts are held to a different standard than
those who are buying components off the shelf, they are not. Both
are held to a negligence standard. However, their economic
capacity to adopt a different design must be taken into account
when determining whether each behaved reasonably under all of
the circumstances that confronted them, and it is entirely possible
that a party with greater capacity to act will be negligent for their
failure to utilize that capacity, while the conduct of a defendant
with a lesser capacity will not be found wanting.
It is for this reason, perhaps, that it is widely agreed that
simple compliance with a statutory or regulatory standard is
evidentiary, rather than conclusive. The statute or regulation sets
the minimum behavioral standard to which all are held regardless
of individual capacity. 272 In common parlance, the statutory or
1994).
266. Appel v. Standex Int'l Corp., 660 P.2d 686 (Or. App. 1983).
267. Id. at 687.

268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See Wilson, 577 P.2d 1322 (involving a claim that a fuel-injected engine
(rather than a carbureted one) and a different type of restraint harness should
have been utilized, notwithstanding that the FAA had approved the use of
carburetors).
271. Appel, 660 P.2d at 688.
272. One committed to an individualized assessment of negligence might
well argue that it is inappropriate to hold a defendant to a standard which it
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regulatory behavioral standard sets a floor, rather than a ceiling.
While it is true that some commentators, particularly those whose
inclination is to distrust jury decision making, have called for
greater weight to be given to compliance, their arguments against
allowing laypersons serving as jurors to second-guess the asserted
expertise of federal regulators are generally based on institutional
competence and/or administrative efficiency, rather than fairness
or individual culpability. 273 Moreover,. as will be discussed shortly,

cannot meet. In fact, in most negligence per se cases, this has been recognized
in the form of permitting a defendant to offer an excuse that it "is unable after
reasonable diligence or care to comply." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 288A(2)(c) (1965). Interestingly, the Products Liability Restatement refused
to permit such an excuse in product design cases. Comment d to Section 4
explains:
In contrast to Subsection (a), the parallel common-law rule governing
noncompliance with safety statutes or regulations in negligence actions
not involving products liability claims recognizes that noncompliance
with an applicable safety statute or regulation does not constitute
failure to use due care when the defendant establishes a justification or
excuse for the violation. For example, if noncompliance with an
administrative regulation under conditions of emergency or temporary
impossibility would not constitute a violation in a direct enforcement
proceeding, noncompliance alone does not prove negligence. In
connection with the adequacy of product designs and warnings,
however, design and marketing decisions are made before distribution to
users and consumers. The product seller therefore has the option of
deferring sale until statutory or regulatory compliance is achieved.
Consequently, justification or excuse of the sort anticipated in
connection with negligence claims generally does not apply in connection
with failure to comply with statutes or regulations governing product
design or warnings.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 4 cmt. d (1998). Thus, in
effect, the Products Liability Restatement, which generally seeks to utilize a
negligence standard, has chosen in this instance, to utilize a strict liability
approach.
273. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 255, at 1255-56 (arguing his proposed
compliance defense "will uphold the integrity of agency decision-making on
product safety issues and protect it against collateral attack in the courts.
Second, it will insulate product manufacturers against wasteful and
unnecessary litigation. [Additionally, it will] reduce overhead costs [and]
secure significant administrative cost savings . . . ."); Victor E. Schwartz &
Cary Silverman, supra note 15, at 1231 (arguing that a regulatory compliance
defense provides "a powerful incentive for companies to adhere to government
safety standards, as well as for properly rewarding behavior that is in the
public interest.").
The asserted superiority of agency expertise of jury decision making has
also been used in conjunction with a claim of congressional intent. See e.g.,
Bruesewitz, 131 U.S. at 1085 (claiming that "[t]o allow a jury in effect to
second-guess those determinations is to substitute less expert for more expert
judgment, thereby threatening manufacturers with liability (indeed, strict
liability) in instances where any conflict between experts and nonexperts is
likely to be particularly severe-instances where Congress intended the
contrary.").
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in cases where a regulation is based on a cost-benefit analysis that
takes broad macro-economic factors into consideration, there are
few similarities between the underlying considerations for
regulators and those which a jury is asked to consider in assessing
a defendant's conduct. 274 Thus, to the extent that those who favor
a regulatory compliance defense to avoid having a jury secondguess the regulators, their argument is simply misplaced. In fact,
in some of the cases the considerations for the regulators are so
different from those of a jury, that it is difficult to see why
compliance with the statute or regulation should even be
considered relevant. 275
2. Compliance with the Lighter Regulation as a Defense
Should a lighter distributor's compliance with the eighty-five
percent standard constitute a defense, given the background of the
CPSC's adoption of the standard? In his deservedly famous dissent
in Wilson v. PiperAircraft Co.,276 Hans Linde explained:
[O]nce the common-law premise of liability is expressed as a
balance of social utility so closely the same as the judgment
made in administering safety legislation, it become very
problematic to assume that one or a sequence of law courts
and juries are to repeat that underlying social judgment de
novo as each sees fit. Rather, when the design of a product is
subject not only to prescribed performance standards but to
government supervised testing and specific approval or
disapproval on safety grounds, no further balance whether
the product design is "unreasonably dangerous" for its
intended or foreseeable use under the conditions for which it
is approved needs to be struck by a court or jury unless one of
two things can be shown: ether that the standards of safety
and utility assigned to the regulatory scheme are less
inclusive or demanding than the premises of the law of
products liability, or that the regulatory agency did not
address the allegedly defective element of the design or in
some way fell short or its assigned task. 277
Using this approach, it seems manifestly improper to find
that compliance with the CPSC's eighty-five percent standard
should provide a defense-particularly in cases where the
defendant is Bic, Cricket, or Scripto-Tokai, the big three of the
disposable lighter industry.2 78 Assuming that plaintiffs counsel
could establish that the named defendant had the technological
and practical ability to have manufactured a safer usable
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See infra text accompanying notes 274-80.
See infra text accompanying notes 284-86.
Wilson, 577 P.2d at 1334-35 (Linde, J., dissenting).
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 218.

2011]1

Tort Reform and Implied Conflict Preemption

883

disposable lighter (that would have avoided the harm that forms
the basis of the suit)-i.e., if the plaintiff can show the existence of
a feasible (or reasonable) alternative design as he or she would be
required to do under most states' products liability law, the
regulation provides no basis for immunizing the defendant. The
broad economic considerations upon which the eighty-five percent
compromise standard was based dealt with economic protection of
non-parties. 279 To allow one of the big three to rely on the standard
would, in effect, permit them to defend upon the basis of economic
considerations that would not be otherwise admissible at trial. 280
3.

Conflict Preemptionand Regulatory Compliance Distinguished

It is important to distinguish the issues involved in
application of the regulatory compliance defense from those
underlying preemption, though the distinction has become
increasingly blurred as courts occasionally conflate the two. For
example, in Mwesigwa v. Dap, Inc., 281 a case dealing with the
alleged excessive flammability of contact cement, the court framed
the preemption issue as follows:
Under Plaintiffs' theory, a jury could override the cost-benefit
analysis done by CPSC and determine for itself whether the
product was unreasonably dangerous. The Court finds that
banning the sale of flammable contact cement under the
guise of a common law tort action is impliedly preempted by
the CPSA, and Plaintiffs' common law tort claims for
defective design, sales, and distribution are barred by conflict
preemption. 282
It is common to question whether jurors have the expertise to
reanalyze cost-benefit factors previously considered by the
regulatory agency in cases where it is claimed that statutory or
regulatory compliance should serve as a defense. There is a strong
argument to be made that such "second-guessing" should not be
permitted if the determinations by the two bodies are based on the
same factors. 283
In the case of the CPSC regulation of disposable lighters, it is
obvious that very different factors were considered by the agency
than possibly could have been considered by a jury. The economic
impact on the small players in the lighter industry, though
necessarily considered by the CPSC because of the terms of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, would clearly be outside of jury
279. See supra text accompanying notes 227-29.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 243-47.
281. Mwesigwa v. Dap, Inc., No. 4:08CV605 JCH, 2010 WL 979697, at *5
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2010) aff'd Mwesigwa v. Dap, Inc., 637 F.3d 884 (8th Cir.
2011).
282. Id.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 273-78.
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consideration. 284
If federal preemption is grounded in congressional intent, it is
not a matter of second-guessing the agency's determination.
Rather, it involves figuring out the underlying policy and whether
its implementation would be frustrated by jury decision making.
The fact that juries will inevitably be basing their decisions by
consideration of wholly different factors than the agency is of no
significance if that allocation of decision-making power will thwart
the underlying objective. In fact, under those circumstances, any
discussion of institutional competence and the merits of jury
decision making misses the mark.
In the conflict preemption cases, a judge's role is not
evaluative in the sense that he or she does not get to decide
whether it is good policy or bad policy--either will have a
preemptive effect in the case of conflict. It is only evaluative in the
sense that if jury decision making will either advance the
underlying policy goal or, at least, not interfere with it, then it
should not be preempted. 285 Consider, for example, Ball v. Bic
Corp.,286 a case that involved a lighter which lacked child-resistant
features. The lighter was manufactured and sold by the defendant
in May 1994, during the one-year period following promulgation of
the CPSC rule and its effective date. 287 As previously noted, the
one-year delay instituted by the CPSC was intended to reduce the
burden on small importers. 288 The delay had nothing to do with
this particular defendant's capacity to change the design and, in
fact, the Ball decision specifically notes that Bic was
simultaneously marketing lighters that had incorporated childresistant features. 289
In such a case, the argument for a regulatory compliance
defense would be extremely weak. Under a preemption defense,
frustration of purpose is at least somewhat more plausible,
although, it may come down to how broadly or narrowly the policy
is articulated. Of course, the recent judicial willingness to find
federal preemption in many of these cases has largely mooted the
debate over statutory compliance.

284. See supra text accompanying notes 226-27.
285. See, e.g., Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1091 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "the fact that Congress has never directed the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) or any other federal agency to review vaccines for
optimal vaccine design . . . [makes it seem] highly unlikely that Congress

intended to eliminate the traditional mechanism for such review (i.e., design
defect liability), particularly given its express retention of state tort law in the
Vaccine Act.").
286. Ball, 2000 WL 33312192.
287. Id. at *1-2.
288. See supra note 224-25.
289. Ball, 2000 WL 33312192, at *1.
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D. Conflict Preemption and FederalPolicy
There are at least two separate, though related, issues that
courts need to confront in the implied conflict cases. First, as the
Court has noted, 290 the presence of the savings clause necessarily
leads to the conclusion that Congress contemplated some nonuniformity. But how does one know how much? Secondly, how can
a court determine whether the imposition of tort liability will
promote the underlying federal policy when there may be multiple
policies and there is no way to know how to weigh them?
The first issue has been relatively easy to deal with, although
whether courts are imposing their own order or following
congressional desires is impossible to know. In the lighter cases,
courts have permitted injured plaintiffs to assert legal theories
that were not squarely addressed by the regulating agency.
1. Allowance of Non-Covered Tort Litigation
It is clear that not all aspects of lighter design were made the
subject of the rule. The eighty-five percent standard dealt solely
with the ease or difficulty of use of the product as measured by the
ability of children under the age of five to produce a flame. Thus,
courts have properly recognized that, other than ease of use,
products
liability
cases
dealing
with
failure-to-warn,
manufacturing defect, and design defect claims, could not possibly
conflict with whatever the federal policy may have been.
In Colon ex rel. Molina v. BIC USA, Inc.,291 one of the
plaintiffs design defect theories was that the colors of the plastic
lighters made them excessively attractive to children. 292 After
noting that the federal regulations do not address warning label
requirements and, therefore, do not preempt claims of inadequate
warning, 293 the court turned to the design issue, ultimately
concluding that:
The CPSC regulations establish general, rudimentary and
minimal requirements-that the child resistant mechanisms
on the lighters "reset . . . automatically", "not impair safe

operation ... when used in a normal and convenient
manner", "be reasonably effective for the expected life of the
lighter", and "not be easily overridden or deactivated." The
regulations do not specify design alternatives or production
methods from which manufacturers may choose, nor do they
address what colors can and cannot be used in connection

290. See supra text accompanying notes 197-98.
291. Colon, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 209 n.15.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 207. See also Ball, 2000 WL 33312192, at *3 (holding that
although the warning claim was not preempted, plaintiff could not show
causation).
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with the manufacture and distribution of these lighters. 294
Along the same lines, in Cumming v. BIC USA, 295 the
plaintiff contended the lighter was defective because the childresistant feature could be "easily removed within seconds by use of
ordinary household utensils like forks, knives, pens or nearly any
other sharp, rigid object."296 Finding that the ease with which a
safety feature could be removed was not dealt with in any detail by
the CPSA,297 the court found liability would not conflict. 298 In Bic
Pen Corp. v. Carter,299 the case was permitted to go to a jury on a
manufacturing defect theory,300 even though the Texas Supreme
Court found implied conflict preemption defeated the claim of
design defect.30 1
2. Conflict Preemption on the "Ease of Use" Design Theory
The second issue-the determination of whether tort
litigation advances or hinders the underlying federal policydepends on how one defines the policy itself. It is here that the
indeterminacy problems inherent in implied conflict preemption
cause the entire area of the law to fall apart. For example, in both
Carter v. Bic Pen Corp.302 and Frith v. Bic Corp.,303 Texas and
Mississippi courts agreed that the CPSC rule represented a
compromise between safety and ease of use, and concluded in each
case that the federal policy of making easy-to-use disposable
lighters available to adult users would be frustrated by the
imposition of state tort liability. 304 In Carter,the court held:

294. Id. at 207-08 (footnote and citations omitted).
295. Cumming v. BIC USA, 628 F. Supp. 2d 737 (W.D. Ky. 2009).
296. Id. at 742.
297. Id. (citing Safety Standard for Multi-Purpose Lighters, 64 Fed. Reg.
71,854 (Dec. 22, 1999) (to be codified 16 C.F.R. pt. 1) "[t]he Commission is
expressing no position at this time on any criterion for when a lighter is easily
deactivated. If the staff identifies either a cigarette lighter or a multipurpose
lighter model with a child resistant mechanism that it believes can be easily
deactivated, the Office of Compliance would consider appropriate action.").
298. Id.
299. Bic Pen Corp. v. Carter, 171 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. App. 2005), rev'd 251
S.W.3d 500 (2008).
300. 2008 WL 5090757, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008).
301. Carter,251 S.W.3d at 507.
302. Id. at 500.
303. Frith, 863 So.2d 960 (Miss. 2004).
304. Additionally, in the course of finding federal preemption as to the
defective design claims, the courts in Ball, 2000 WL 33312192, at *2 and
Carter,251 S.W.3d at 508 relied, at least in part, on a provision of the CPSA
that allows states the right to seek exceptions from the CPSC standard. See
supra note 202. That section, which permits states to seek exemptions from
the CPSC rule, however, seems only relevant to state product regulation to be
achieved by state statute or state regulation-not common-law litigation.
Although the Court has held that tort litigation may be a form of state

2011]

887

Tort Reform and Implied Conflict Preemption

Interpreting federal regulation in this area as a liability floor
that may be enhanced by state law .. . undercuts the federal

regulations and the Commission's conclusion that the eightfive percent test "strikes a reasonable balance between
improved safety for a substantial majority of young children
and other potential fire victims and the potential for adverse
competitive effects and manufacturing disruption." Because
the Commission weighed these competing concerns when
drafting its standard, we conclude that imposing a common
law rule that would impose liability above the federal
standard is contrary to the Commission's plan and conflicts
with federal law. 05
In Frith too, the court focused on the Commission's attempt to
"reach a balance by sanctioning child-resistant lighters not too
difficult for adult operation."3 06 According to the court:
If a state law claim succeeded in imposing stricter childresistant

requirements

. . . then

the lighter would

be

sufficiently difficult for an adult to operate, thus causing
adults to resort to less safer methods of producing fire, such
as matches. The end result would be that the more stringent
state standard would stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the federal objective of producing for the
adult consumer a usable lighter which was yet as childresistant as feasible. If we were to adopt the Friths' standard
... we would be adopting a state law which would no doubt

undermine and frustrate the federal objective and thus
conflict with federal law.30 7
In contrast to the decisions in Carter and Frith,consider the
30
approach adopted in Colon ex rel. Molina v. BIC USA, Inc. 8
There, noting that the eighty-five percent standard represented a
compromise between safety and economic considerations, the court
concluded that "[v]iewed in this light, it is difficult to construe
these regulations as anything but a mandatory minimum standard
with which all manufacturers or importers must comply." 309
regulation, it is obviously not the only form and the language relied upon by
the court seems unlikely to be directed at tort litigation. In fact, how such a
procedure could even be instituted with the context of a tort case is anybody's
guess. Nevertheless, in Carter, noting that under the relevant regulation
states had the power to apply to the Commission to "exempt a state regulation
if it affords a significantly higher degree of protection and does not unduly
burden interstate commerce" and since "[p]laintiff has not shown that the
State . . . has made an application for exemption[]" the court found the

"design defect claim ... [to be] preempted by the CPSC." Carter,251 S.W.3d at
508.
305. Carter,251 S.W.3d at 507.
306. Frith, 863 So.2d at 967.
307. Id.
308. 136 F. Supp. 2d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
309. Id. at 208.
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It should be noted that none of these three preemption cases
seriously considered the possibility that the potential imposition of
tort liability might serve to advance the safety/ease of use policy of
the CPSC. Assume, for example, that after promulgation of the
regulation it became technologically feasible to produce a safer
lighter without adversely affecting its ease of use. If such a design
advance became technologically and practically feasible, imposing
liability for not adopting that design would be entirely consistent
with at least part of the federal policy. 310 On the other hand, if
such a change could not be made-i.e., if, at the time of that the
product was distributed there was no reasonable or feasible
alternative design, there would be no basis under either Texas
law, 311 or Mississippi law, 3 12 to find that the product was defective

310. See Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1097 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing
that "the majority's position elides a significant difference between state tort
law and the federal regulatory scheme. Although the Vaccine Act charges the
Secretary of Health and Human Services with the obligation to 'promote the
development of childhood vaccines' and 'make or assumer improvements in ...
vaccines, and research on vaccines,' neither the Act nor any other provision of
federal law places a legal duty on vaccine manufacturers to improve the design
of their vaccines to account for scientific and technological advances. Indeed,
the FDA does not condition approval of a vaccine on it being the most
optimally designed among reasonably available alternatives, nor does it (or
any other federal entity) ensure that licensed vaccines keep pace with
technological and scientific advances.").
311. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Annotated Section 82.005
(1993) provides:
(a) In a products liability action in which a claimant alleges a design
defect, the burden is on the claimant to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that:
(1) there was a safer alternative design; and
(2) the defect was a producing cause of the personal injury, property
damage, or death for which the claimant seeks recovery.
(b) In this section, "safer alternative design" means a product design
other than the one actually used that in reasonable probability:
(1) would have prevented or significantly reduced the risk of the
claimant's personal injury, property damage, or death without
substantially impairing the product's utility; and
(2) was economically and technologically feasible at the time the
product left the control of the manufacturer or seller by the
application of existing or reasonably achievable scientific knowledge.
312. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (West. 1993) ("[a] product is not defective in
design or formulation if the harm for which the claimant seeks to recover
compensatory damages was caused by an inherent characteristic of the
product which is a generic aspect of the product that cannot be eliminated
without substantially compromising the product's usefulness or desirability
and which is recognized by the ordinary person with the ordinary knowledge
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by reason of its design.
Apparently, then, the policy being articulated in those cases
finding conflict preemption, or at least the one relied upon, was
one of unchanging uniformity of design standard as a substantive
goal in and of itself, although why Congress would desire such a
goal is unclear. If uniformity is the goal, virtually any common-law
litigation has the potential to interfere. In other words, the
manner in which the issue is articulated will necessarily dictate
the conclusion that state tort litigation would interfere with that
uniformity.31 3 In that sense, the preemption chosen by the courts
seems to resemble field preemption or, at least, partial field
preemption, more than conflict preemption.3 14
Of course, by announcing the existence of a federal policy of
uniformity, the courts' decisions serve to establish a no-liability
rule in many respects parallel to what was achieved by finding no
duty in Gomez.3 15 In Gomez, the court considered the effect of the
litigation on non-parties, turning the question of duty into a
matter of broad economic policy.316 Frith, Ball, and Carter,
considered a regulation enacted in large part, if not primarily, for
the protection of companies not involved in the litigation to
effectively immunize the defendant.
The same problem is evident in Bruesewitz31 7 where the Court
held that design-defect claims were preempted by the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. Although on its face the case was
decided on the basis of statutory construction,318 the dissent, in
effect, accused the majority and concurrence of deciding the case
based on considerations not before the court. Thus, Justice
Sotomayor asserted:
Respondent notes that there are some 5,000 petitions
common to the community.").
313. Carter, 251 S.W.3d at 508. The Carter court did point out that the
Commission "specifically noted that '[a] higher ([ninety] percent) acceptance
criterion was also considered,' but rejected because the 'higher performance
level [was] not commercially or technically feasible for many firms' and 'would
have substantial adverse effects on manufacturing and competition, and would
increase costs disproportionate to benefits."' The court did not mention,
however, that these factors, even if substantiated, did not pertain to the
defendant. See also Frith, 862 So.2d at 963 n.1 (citing 58 Fed. Reg. at 37,578
("if adults are unable to use child-resistant lighters, they may switch to
available non-child resistant lighters.").
314. See supra text accompanying note 194.
315. Gomez, 146 S.W.3d at 170. See also supra notes 137-43 and
accompanying text.
316. See id. at 197 (responding to the dissenting opinion, Justice Hecht
remarked that "[w]here 'no court has gone before' would be to hold a flint
supplier liable for failing to give abrasive blasting workers the warnings their
own employers should have given.").
317. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1068.
318. Id. at 1075-78.
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alleging a causal link between certain vaccines and autism
spectrum disorders that are currently pending in an omnibus
proceeding in the Court of Federal Claims. According to
respondent, a ruling that § 22(b)(1) does not pre-empt design
defect claims could unleash a "crushing wave" of tort
litigation that would bankrupt vaccine manufacturers and
deplete vaccine supply. This concern underlies many of the
policy arguments in respondent's brief and appears to
underlie the majority and concurring opinions in this case.319
If Justice Sotomayor is correct, then preemption is little more
than tort reform from the bench and congressional intent is a
fiction through which the Court imposes its judgment on the
resolution of wholly unrelated questions of public policy.
3. Another Approach to Preemption
To this point, there have been two assumptions underlying
the discussion. Both have been necessitated by the courts'
decisions, but neither is necessarily correct. First, since the
Supreme Court's preemption decisions have asserted reliance on
congressional intent, it has been assumed that there is no other
plausible approach, even though it is obvious to all that
congressional intent is a transparent fiction in this context.
Second, it has been assumed that legislative bodies, including
Congress, have the unrestrained prerogative to alter or abolish
tort rights and remedies, subject only to the very weak restraints
imposed by substantive due process limitations, i.e., the rational
basis test. 320
However, both of these assumptions have been challenged
recently. Accepting the challenges would necessitate reevaluating
both federal preemption from an institutional competence
approach, and the importance of tort litigation in the face of claims
that it can be displaced.
a. Institutional Competence
In a recent article, Mark Seidenfeld proposed approaching
federal preemption in a novel way. Rather than clinging to the
pretense that preemption is a matter of congressional intent, he
argued that an agency's ability to declare its regulations
preemptive of state products liability law be inferred from the
general fact of congressional delegation of rule-making authority
to the agency. 321 If one grants his central premise that a legitimate
power to preempt may be exercised on this basis, the question
becomes whether the agency should exercise that power. The

319. Id. at 1100 n.25 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

320. See supra text accompanying notes 144-55.
321. Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 612.
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answer to this, he argues, is found in the analysis of the relative
institutional decision-making competence of regulatory agencies as
compared to that of Congress and, more importantly for our
purposes, common-law tort "regulation."322
Supporting his conclusion that agencies are in the best
position to make the preemption decision, 323 Seidenfeld claims that
agencies are better than juries at setting efficient care levels;
reducing uncertainty (which might discourage the production of
useful products, achieving national uniformity of product design,
and thus reducing overall cost of production); preventing
individual states from imposing unduly strict design standards on
other states; increasing transparency and political accountability;
and increasing accuracy in assessing costs and benefits based on
administrators' better training and jurors' tendency to overstate
the costs associated with compensation and understate the cost of
accident avoidance.324
However, these claims include some that are not provable and
others that are simply wrong. For example, the familiar argument
that juries overstate compensatory damages is simply not
supported by empirical evidence. 325 Moreover, since various types
of damages are typically not allowable in tort actions-pure
economic loss and pure emotional distress damages, to take two
obvious examples-there is a good chance that jury verdicts
systemically understate the cost of accidents.
The claim that product producers need certainty and
predictability that is unavailable though a case-by-case
adjudication process is also questionable. After all, as I have
pointed out elsewhere, 326 strict liability is just as certain and
predictable as no liability. When confronted with the strict liability
experiment of the 1960s, '70s, and '80s, defendants complained
about the unfairness of a system that did not allow them to
exculpate themselves on an individualized basis. 327 In other words,

322. Id. at 615-17.
323. Id. at 659.
324. Id. at 617-31.
325. See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIvIL JURY AND
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 23, 175-77 (2000) (arguing that the widespread
belief that jurors are sympathetic to plaintiffs in corporate cases is wrong, and
that jurors' attitude toward businesses are generally positive). The evidence
regarding the award of punitive damages is more controversial. See Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1165, 1198-1200 (2003) (discussing the arbitrary nature of how juries
decide damage awards, leading scholars to argue that such awards should be
subject to more bureaucratic control).
326. Martin A. Kotler, Social Norms and Judicial Rulemaking: Commitment
to Political Process and the Basis of Tort Law, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 65, 106
(2000).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 77-87.
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the only certainty and predictability desired by many defendants
is the certainty and predictability of immunity from liability.
Seidenfeld also argues that agencies can take the benefits of
products into account in a way that juries cannot by factoring in
harm avoided (to non-parties) due to the lives saved as a result of
the availability of certain products. This, he claims, is not a factor
taken into account in tort awards. 328 Although this is not strictly
true, even more important is the fact that product manufacturers
are compensated for the benefits they provide in the form of profits
realized on the sale of beneficial products. It is only when the
products are excessively dangerous to a class of product users or
consumers and harm results that the tort system steps in to
reduce the profitability by requiring compensation to those who
are unjustifiably harmed.
In any event, my purpose here is not to offer a point-by-point
rebuttal of the arguments, or even to review Seidenfeld's own
acknowledgment of the weaknesses of a system that vests sole
decision-making power in administrative agencies. 329 Rather, I
wish to look at the broader question of the value of the tort system
when it is permitted to operate. Seidenfeld acknowledges that "tort
claims have the advantage of providing compensation for victims
of injuries." Although other compensation systems might serve
that function, such alternatives to tort law (e.g., the New Zealand
system of accident compensation) "do not placate the apparent
desire of the public for a requirement that the state make a
finding whether the causation of harm by a producer was wrong
and, if so, to impose the costs created by that wrong on the
producer."330
In other words, though courts do not often adequately
acknowledge it, tort judgments have a societal importance that
goes beyond compensation. And, for that matter, tort is important
for reasons that go well beyond whatever economic regulatory
function such judgments may perform.
b. Civil Recourse Theory
Traditionally, tort scholars have claimed that the purpose of
tort law is to provide compensation to those injured while
simultaneously deterring future misconduct. 331 As previously
discussed, strict liability theorists added various instrumentalist
goals; economists added efficiency; corrective justice theorists

328. Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 620-21.
329. See id. at 642-49.
330. Id. at 632-33.
331. See, e.g., Keeton, supra, note 252, § 4, at 25 (noting that "[t]he
prophylactic factor of preventing future harm has been quite important in the
field of torts.").
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added the restoration of preexisting equality; and so on. 332 More
recently, however, in a series of articles, John C. P. Goldberg and
Benjamin C. Zipursky have developed a variation of corrective
justice theory, which they call "civil recourse" theory.333 Their view
rejects both the traditional "tort law as deterrence" and "tort law
as a means of accomplishing various instrumental goals"
approaches. Instead, they posit that tort exists to provide those
victims (who choose to avail themselves) with "an avenue of civil
recourse against those who have wrongfully injured them."334 In
effect, they argue that the state has prohibited victims of tortious
misbehavior from taking matters into their own hands and
retaliating against the wrongdoer, and thus owes victims an
obligation to provide a state-sanctioned mechanism for revenge
andlor retaliation. As Jason Solomon explained:
Goldberg and Zipursky do, in various places, point to reasons
for having a system of law that provides civil recourse in
place of private vengeance, realizing that even the
interpretive task is not complete or persuasive without an
animating aim that is not only intelligible, but also
normatively justified. Their primary reasons are essentially
twofold: (1) that tort law is a necessary component of an
overall legal system that seeks to peaceably resolve disputes
in order to prevent escalating cycles of vengeance; and (2)
that as a matter of political theory, the state cannot take
away individuals' rights to avenge wrongs done to them
without providing a substitute.33 5
While the idea that tort law is widely perceived to be a system
for achieving retribution or even revenge for harm inflicted by
wrongdoing is not new,336 the elevation of the status of the
imposition of liability in order to get even and the correlative
insistence that the state provide such an avenue of redress brings
a new dimension to the problem.
First, as noted earlier, most state courts and all federal courts
332. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
333. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs and Recourse in the
Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998); John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Article: The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998);
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Article: Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO.
L.J. 695 (2003); John C. P. Goldberg, Article: The ConstitutionalStatus of Tort
Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE
L.J. 524 (2005) [hereinafter, Goldberg, Right to Redress].
334. John C. P. Goldberg, Monsanto Lecture: Ten Half-Truths About Tort
Law, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1221, 1252 (2008).
335. Jason M. Solomon, Article: Equal Accountability Through Tort Law,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1765, 1781 (2009).
336. See Martin A. Kotler, Utility, Autonomy and Motive: A Descriptive
Model of the Development of Tort Doctrine, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1231, 1233
(1990) (arguing that "punishment of wrongdoers is the dominant social
perception of our tort system.").
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have denied the existence of a right to sue, claiming that, because
tort law provides only an economic right, legislatures, under a
substantive due process analysis, can limit or even abolish tort law
as long as such legislation can be defended under a rational basis
test.337 Under civil recourse theory, however, the state owes an
obligation to the citizenry to provide some mechanism "in the
administration of justice, for the redress of private wrongs." 3 3 8
Of course, the redress provided need not have all the
trappings of the trial of civil cases before a jury. Nevertheless, a
public forum where issues of right and wrong can be determined is
essential.
4. Limiting Judicial Choice

Although not acknowledged by the Court's plurality in
Cipollone when it asserted that common-law tort liability is a form
of regulation indistinguishable from state legislation and
administrative regulation, the dissent noted that there are
actually two different forms of frustration preemption.3 3 9 Some of
the cases involve the situation where there is asserted to be a
specific substantive federal policy objective. The allowance of
manufacturer choice in the selection of passive restraint systems is
an example. Other cases, however, do not deal with such
substantive policy, but instead deal with a procedural policy
objective. In these cases, the Court's focus has been on allocating
the decision-making power between Congress and/or agencies, on
the one hand, and either state regulatory bodies and/or local
communities (speaking through juries or state legislators), on the
other hand. 340
Thus, for example, in San Diego Building Trades Council v.

Garmon,341 the conflict preemption case relied upon in finding that
state tort law was a form of regulation in Cipollone,342 the conflict
articulated by the Court was decision making by the National
Labor Relations Board and state common-law adjudication in
cases where the commission of an unfair labor practice had been
alleged. 343 There is an important distinction to be made between
337. See supra note 154 (discussing due process challenges).
338. Goldberg, Right to Redress, supra note 333, at 622 (quoting Mo. Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885)).
339. See supra note 7 (noting the history of the distinction).
340. Here too, the decision is, in theory, a matter of congressional intent,
although it was recently proposed that agencies should be able to claim such
authority to preempt under a broad grant of rule-making authority from
Congress. See Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 611-12.
341. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 236.
342. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521.
343. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246. The Court specifically noted, "[s]ince the
National Labor Relations Board has not adjudicated the status of the conduct
for which the State of California seeks to give a remedy in damages, and since
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the types of conflicts presented in the two cases. In decisionallocation cases, such as Garmon, even though a state commonlaw damage remedy is denied to the plaintiff, he, she, or it, still
has a recourse to some remedy, albeit not necessarily the one
desired. In the substantive policy conflict cases, the finding of
preemption may well leave the plaintiff with no remedy at all.
Although, as Catherine Sharkey has noted, an analysis of the
federal conflict preemption cases seems to indicate significant
reluctance by the Court to find preemption when the result is to
deprive the injured plaintiff of any remedy whatsoever, 344 the
issue is obscured by the Court's insistence that it is a matter of
congressional intent. Thus, for example, in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth
LLC 345 the Court stated that: "[We previously have expressed
doubt that Congress would quietly preempt product-liability
claims without providing a federal substitute ... [though] we have

never suggested we would be skeptical of preemption unless the
congressional substitute operated like the tort system." 346
If courts were to limit the operation of conflict preemption to
those cases where there is either "impossibility," as it has been

such activity is arguably within the compass of § 7 or § 8 of the [National
Labor Relations] Act, the State's jurisdiction is displaced." Moreover, the
Garmon Court continued by stating:
Even the States' salutary effort to redress private wrongs or grant
compensation for past harm cannot be exerted to regulate activities that
are potentially subject to the exclusive federal regulatory scheme. It
may be that an award of damages in a particular situation will not, in
fact, conflict with the active assertion of federal authority. The same
may be true of the incidence of a particular state injunction. To sanction
either involves a conflict with federal policy in that it involves allowing
two law-making sources to govern. In fact, since remedies form an
ingredient of any integrated scheme of regulation, to allow the State to
grant a remedy here which has been withheld from the National Labor
Relations Board only accentuates the danger of conflict.
Id. (citing Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 492-97 (1953)).
344. See Sharkey, supra note 174, at 480 n.146 ("The Court has repeatedly
noted that only in the clearest of cases should a court find that Congress
intended wholly to remove any and all remedies for injured citizens, let alone
accept an agency's view that such was the intent of Congress. See e.g., Bates v.
Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005) ("If Congress had intended to
deprive injured parties of a long available form of compensation, it surely
would have expressed that intent more clearly."); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984) ("It is difficult to believe that Congress would,
without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by
illegal conduct.") (other cross references omitted). See also id. at 480 (terming
the elimination of common-law tort actions as the creation of "a remedial or
enforcement 'void."').
345. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct at 1080.
346. Id. at 1080. But see text accompanying notes 149-55 (regarding
legislative power to abolish the right to sue in tort without providing an
alternative remedy).
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defined by the Court, 347 or frustration of federal policy in a
decision-making allocation sense so that there remains some
recourse for the injured victim, it would ensure some level of
fairness to the tort reform being mandated by the judiciary. In
cases where an alternative to common-law litigation is not
available, care must be taken to ensure that common-law tort is
left in place. It may be true, of course, that common-law lawsuits
may frustrate policy from time to time,348 yet, if it were to become
pervasive, there may be room for congressional correction.
Arguably, that is what the Supreme Court is doing anyway, just
not being above-board about it.
V. CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING IN THE FACE OF
INDETERMINACY

If I am correct and, in the final analysis, the indeterminacy
problems are so overwhelming as to make it impossible to
determine which of the cases are right and which are wrong so
that one cannot identify and articulate substantive public policy
when Congress fails or refuses to say what it means, where does
that leave us?
Even though the traditional distinction between judge and
policymaker has become seriously blurred, 349 and the current
political climate seems to favor tort reform, even from the bench,
there remain limits on the role of the judiciary.3 50 To cross the
line-even for elected judges-is to risk a loss of institutional
legitimacy.
The concept of "legitimacy," of course, though frequently

347. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
348. The Court has always acknowledged that Congress may freely opt for
inconsistent policies. See e.g., Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 564 ("As Justice O'Connor
explained in her opinion for a unanimous Court: 'The case for federal preemption is particularly weak where Congress has indicated its awareness of
the operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and has nonetheless
decided to stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is]
between them."' (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 166-67 (1989))).
349. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (upholding the
right of judges to state political positions during judicial elections). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 7(b) (2010) ("In exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing
principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of
cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary
duty of reasonable care requires modification.").
350. At the very least, judges are critical of other judges when they make
policy-based arguments with which they disagree. See e.g., Bruesewitz, 131
U.S. at 1101 n.24 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("Justice Breyer's separate
concurrence is even more explicitly policy driven, reflecting his own preference
for the 'more expert judgment' of federal agencies over the 'less expert'
judgment of juries.").
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raised in the context of unelected public officials accused of
thwarting the will of the majority, is not limited to the process by
which the official comes to power and the public willingness to
accept and be bound by such decisions because of its acceptance of
the selection process.3 51 Legitimacy also deals with the public
willingness to accept as authoritative judicial pronouncements
because the pronouncements themselves are not so far out of the
cultural mainstream that they command the respect of those who
disagree with them.352
To the extent that judicial decisions appear arbitrary or, as is
more often the case, overtly partisan, ideologically driven or, at
least subject to that interpretation, they risk undermining the
popular respect necessary to legitimate them. 353 This form of
illegitimacy in judicial policymaking is commonly condemned as
being one variant of "judicial activism." Of course, the
condemnation of "judicial activism" has become a common feature
in our current political discourse and many commentators have
asserted that it is an essentially meaningless term which is
indiscriminately applied to any judicial decision with which the
user disagrees. Nevertheless, a number of commentators have
argued that there are, in fact, limitations on judicial decision
making which, if ignored or exceeded, fairly open a court to the
"activist" charge. There are really two forms of activism: (1)
"Institutional Activism," the failure to give suitable respect and
deference to other institutions of government; 354 and (2) what can
be termed "Partisan" or "Ideological Activism," deciding cases in
accordance with political party lines or based on the judge's
personal ideological preference.355
The first form of activism is present in the preemption cases if
351. Regarding electoral sanction as the basis of legitimacy, see Martin A.
Kotler, Social Norms and Judicial Rulemaking: Commitment to Political
Processand the Basis of Tort Law, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 65, 75-79 (2000).
352. Id. at 88-89.
353. See Williamson, 131 S. Ct. 1131
("Purposes-and-objectives pre-emption-which by design roams beyond
statutory or regulatory text-is thus wholly illegitimate. It instructs courts
to pre-empt state laws based on judges' 'conceptions of a policy which
Congress has not expressed and which is not plainly to be inferred by the
legislation which it has enacted."'); Id. at 1142 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
354. See William P. Marshall, Conservative and the Seven Sins of Judicial
Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1220 (2002) (referring to "CounterMajoritarian Activism" defined as "the reluctance of the courts to defer to the
decisions of the democratically elected branches."). See also Ernest A. Young,
Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1144
(2002) (identifying a similar category).
355. Marshall, supra note 354, at 1246 (distinguishing "partisan" and
"ideological" activism), and Young, supra note 354, at 1144 (identifying the use
"partisan" preferences as "activism").
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one views those decisions that refuse to find preemption a failure
to respect the authority of the agency, assuming the agency has
been appropriately vested with authority. If, on the other hand,
one feels that preemption should not be found, then it is the
agencies which are refusing to respect the authority of the state
judiciary, or more accurately, the jury as representative of the
community.3 56 Certainly, however, in the absence of a more
convincing account of how courts are to make the necessary
determinations regarding the identification of federal policy in a
principled fashion, the charge or partisanship or political ideology
is salient. Partisan or ideological activism is inappropriate because
of its utter incompatibility with the ideal of judicial impartiality.
Institutional activism, on the other hand, reflects an inflated view
of the importance of either the institution of the judiciary and a
corresponding deprecation of either the role or views of other
institutions, 357 most notably that of the jury and its active
normative role in the assignment of responsibility for harm.

356. See Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 649 (discussing agencies' "willingness
to shortchange state interests").
357. See Young, supra note 354, at 1145 (asserting that activist behavior
"involve[s] a refusal by the court deciding a particular case to defer to other
sorts of authority at the expense of its own independent judgment about the
correct legal outcome. Each sort of behavior, then tends to increase the
significance of the court's own institutional role vis-A-vis the political
branches, the Framers and Ratifiers of the Constitution, or other courts
deciding cases in the past or in the future." (footnotes omitted)).

